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I.  INTRODUCTION 
Tensions between insurance companies and their policyholders 
have significantly increased within the last fifteen years.1  When the 
disputes resulting from these increasingly adversarial relationships 
have been brought into the courts, juries have awarded policyholders 
large verdicts.2  Today, an insurer that denies coverage does so at its 
own financial risk.  Even if an insurance company denies payment 
because an apparently sound basis for a defense or a settlement 
exists, a bad-faith judgment may nevertheless result if it is later 
determined that the insurer’s denial was “wrongful.”  If the insurer is 
found to have acted in bad faith, it might pay a judgment in excess of 
its policy limits to a third party, or pay to its insured the underlying 
amount covered by the policy, including any emotional distress 
damages suffered and, potentially, punitive damages. 
Two decades ago, courts relied exclusively on substantive 
contract law to resolve insurance policy disputes.3  Historically, there 
was no differentiation between breaches of insurance contracts and 
breaches of ordinary commercial contracts.4  Where a wrongful 
denial of policy benefits was established, the successful policyholder 
was awarded the amount due under the policy, plus interest.5  
Damages for emotional distress or economic loss were not available 
 
 1 Douglas R. Richmond, An Overview of Insurance Bad Faith Law and Litigation, 25 
SETON HALL L. REV. 74, 75 (1994). 
 2 Id. 
 3 See Randy Papetti, Note, The Insurer’s Duty of Good Faith in the Context of 
Litigation, 60 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1931 (1992). 
 4 Id.  Traditionally, breach of insurance contracts were treated the same as 
breaches of ordinary commercial contracts.  Policy holders who established a 
wrongful denial of policy benefits would receive only the amount due on the policy, 
plus interest.  Phyllis Savage, Note, The Availability of Excess Damages for Wrongful 
Refusal to Honor First Party Insurance Claims, 45 FORDHAM L. REV. 164, 164-66 (1976).  
However, in Braesch v. Union Insurance Co., 464 N.W.2d 769 (Neb. 1991), the court 
explained the difference in the nature of the relationship that exists between the 
insurance carrier and its insured from other consensual commercial relationships.  
The court set forth three reasons for this difference: (1) the public status of 
insurance contracts; (2) the non-commercial aspects of insurance contracts; and (3) 
the inequality of bargaining power in the relationship between the insured and the 
insurance company.  Id. at 774-75.  One commentator has described the primary 
difference on “public interest” grounds, noting that insurance plays a pivotal role in 
modern capitalistic society which demands public regulation and oversight.  See 
Roger C. Henderson, The Tort of Bad Faith in First-Party Insurance Transactions: Refining 
the Standard of Culpability and Reformulating the Remedies by Statute, 26 U. MICH. J.L. 
REFORM 1, 7-11 (1992). 
 5 Papetti, supra note 3, at 1931; see also Savage, supra note 4, at 164-66. 
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under general contract law.6  Punitive damages were not available as a 
deterrent.7 
Unlike standard contractual relationships which are entered into 
at arm’s length, a special relationship exists regarding the purchase 
of insurance due to the parties’ perceived unequal bargaining power 
and the nature of insurance policies.  This relationship can, 
potentially, allow unscrupulous insurance companies to exploit their 
insureds’ misfortune by refusing to resolve or settle claims.8  In fact, 
insurance policies are routinely characterized as contracts of 
adhesion.9  The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals made the following 
observation: 
When coverage and liability are established . . . a game of the 
strong against the weak can begin.  A claim known to be valid and 
legitimate can be settled for far less than its actual value if the 
need for funds by the victim is great enough and the insurance 
company is obstinate enough to use its knowledge of that fact to 
 
 6 See, e.g., Dawkins v. Nat’l Liberty Life Ins. Co., 252 F. Supp. 800, 802-03 (D.S.C. 
1966); Fletcher v. W. Nat’l Life Ins. Co., 89 Cal. Rptr. 78, 92 (Ct. App. 1970); Savage, 
supra note 4, at 167.  Strident common-law principles of foreseeability limited 
recovery to policy benefits.  Terry B. Light, Note, Damages Assessed Against Insurers for 
Wrongful Failure to Pay, 10 WM. & MARY L. REV. 466, 466-68 (1968).  However, 
commentators argued for a broader damages standard since the early 1970s.  See 
David Tartaglio, Note, The Expectation of Peace of Mind: A Basis for Recovery of Damages 
for Mental Suffering Resulting from the Breach of First Party Insurance Contracts, 56 S. CAL. 
L. REV. 1345, 1348 (1983) (arguing that “disruption of peace of mind” damages 
should be awarded); see also Eric M. Holmes, Is There Life After Gilmore’s Death of 
Contract? – Inductions from a Study of Commercial Good Faith in First-Party Insurance 
Contracts, 65 CORNELL L. REV. 330, 339 (1980) (contending that insurance companies 
are aware of the emotional protection policyholders contemplate). 
 7 Light, supra note 6, at 467; Savage, supra note 4, at 167-68.  Allowing punitive 
damages against insurance companies for bad conduct breaches of contract is an 
exception to the general bar on extra-compensatory damages in contract law.  See 
Susan G. Gresham, Note, “Bad Faith Breach”: A New and Growing Concern for Financial 
Institutions, 42 VAND. L. REV. 891, 892 n.5 (1989) (analyzing decisions from 
jurisdictions that follow California courts in allowing tort recovery for bad-faith 
breaches of insurance contracts).  For a representative description of the cases where 
damages were awarded for a denial of coverage based on specious pretexts, see 
Roger C. Henderson, The Tort of Bad Faith in First-Party Insurance Transactions After Two 
Decades, 37 ARIZ. L. REV. 1153 (1995), discussing punitive damage liability triggered 
by outright refusals to pay, delays, misinterpretation of records or policies for the 
purpose of defeating coverage, using threats to force unfair settlements, and falsely 
accusing the insured of wrongdoing.  See also Richmond, supra note 1, at 74-76 
(examining first-party and third-party bad-faith law). 
 8 See, e.g., Arnold v. Nat’l County Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 725 S.W.2d 165, 167 (Tex. 
1987). 
 9 See, e.g., Clemco Indus. v. Commercial Union Ins. Co., 665 F. Supp. 816, 818 
(N.D. Cal. 1987), aff’d, 848 F.2d 1242 (9th Cir. 1988); Intermountain Gas Co. v. 
Indus. Indem. Co., 868 P.2d 510, 513 (Idaho Ct. App. 1994). 
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force acceptance of a lesser sum.10 
Because insurance policies are not purchased for commercial 
advantage, but rather for protection against calamity,11 they are 
unique contracts.  When a covered loss occurs, the insured expects to 
have the purchased protection.  If the insurance company refuses or 
fails to pay a valid claim without sufficient justification, the insured 
may be put in a vulnerable economic position.  In this situation, 
contract damages may fail to provide adequate compensation for the 
breach of security purchased through the insurance contract.  
Moreover, limiting the insured only to contract damages may create 
an incentive for insurance companies to deny claims before 
performing an adequate evaluation of the claim.  In Rawlings v. 
Apodaca,12 the Arizona Supreme Court addressed the need for 
deterring this type of conduct in the insurance context.  According to 
the Rawlings court, contract damages 
offer no motivation whatsoever for the insurer not to breach.  If 
the only damages an insurer will have to pay upon a judgment of 
breach are amounts that it would have owed under the policy plus 
interest, it has every interest in retaining the money, earning the 
higher rates of interest on the outside market, and hoping 
eventually to force the insured into a settlement for less than the 
policy amount.13 
Against this backdrop, courts created tort liability for an 
 
 10 Holmgren v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 976 F.2d 573, 578 (9th Cir. 1992) 
(emphasis omitted).  In State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. v. Simmons, 857 S.W.2d 126, 136 
(Tex. App. 1993), the court observed that the void created by the parties’ disparity of 
bargaining power coupled with the insurance company’s exclusive control over 
claims processing can be filled by imposition of the tort duty of good faith and fair 
dealing. 
 11 Unlike traditional contractual relations, insureds purchase insurance policies 
for peace of mind and security, rather than financial gain.  Love v. Fire Ins. Exch., 
271 Cal. Rptr. 246, 252 (Ct. App. 1990) (“An insured does not enter an insurance 
contract seeking profit, but instead seeks security and peace of mind through 
protection against calamity.”); Ainsworth v. Combined Ins. Co. of Am., 763 P.2d 673, 
676 (Nev. 1988) (“A consumer buys insurance for security, protection, and peace of 
mind.”), reh’g denied, 774 P.2d 1003 (Nev.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 958 (1989). 
 12 726 P.2d 565 (Ariz. 1986). 
 13 Id. at 575 (quoting Wallis v. Superior Court, 207 Cal. Rptr. 123, 128 (Ct. App. 
1984)); see Oki Am., Inc. v. Microtech Int’l, Inc., 872 F.2d 312, 315 (9th Cir. 1989) 
(Kozinski, J., concurring) (“[The] tortification of contract law . . . gives rise to a new 
form of entrepreneurship: investment in tort causes of action.”); White v. W. Title 
Ins. Co., 710 P.2d 309, 312 n.2 (Cal. 1985) (Kaus, J., concurring and dissenting) (“It 
seems to me that attorneys who handle policy claims against insurance companies 
are no longer interested in collecting on those claims, but spend their wits and 
energies trying to maneuver the insurers into committing acts which the insureds can 
later trot out as evidence of bad faith.”). 
  
2004 ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE & WAIVER 517 
insurance company’s unreasonable denial of coverage.14  Although 
limiting recovery to contract damages may create a motivation for 
improper claim handling on the part of the insurance company, the 
creation of tort liability for bad faith produces an equally dangerous 
motivation. 
Part II of this Article provides an overview of insurance bad-faith 
principles.  A foundational understanding of these principles will 
assist the reader in evaluating the role of attorney-client 
communications. 
In Part III, the attorney-client privilege is discussed generally, as 
well as specifically, in the context of insurer bad faith.  In Part III.A., a 
general overview of the attorney-client privilege is presented.  In Part 
III.B., commonly recognized exceptions to the attorney-client 
privilege are discussed, as well as how those exceptions relate to bad-
faith insurance cases.  In Part III.C., express and implied waivers of 
the attorney-client privilege are discussed.  The courts have disagreed 
on the general contours of the test to be applied in determining 
whether an implied waiver of the attorney-client privilege has 
occurred, and what should be the precise formulation for that 
determination.  The courts have also disagreed as to when a client 
may be deemed to have injected privileged attorney-client 
communications into a case, causing an implied waiver.  There are 
three general approaches to determine whether a litigant has 
impliedly waived the attorney-client privilege.  Each of these 
approaches is discussed.  In Part III.D., the Article discusses how the 
direct assertion of the advice-of-counsel defense results in waiver of 
 
 14 Only a few remaining jurisdictions do not recognize first-party bad faith.  As an 
example, Michigan does not recognize an independent bad-faith tort against an 
insurance company for an alleged breach of contract due to the implied covenant of 
good faith and fair dealing.  See Kewin v. Mass. Mut. Life Ins. Co., 295 N.W.2d 50 
(Mich. 1980); see also Roberts v. Auto-Owners Ins. Co., 374 N.W.2d 905, 909 (Mich. 
1985); Ulrich v. Fed. Land Bank of St. Paul, 408 N.W.2d 910, 911 (Mich. Ct. App. 
1991).  Damages recoverable for breach of contract are those that arise naturally 
from the breach or those that were in the contemplation of the parties at the time 
the contract was made.  Kewin, 295 N.W.2d at 53.  However, an insurance company 
does have an obligation to act in “good faith” in its resolution of claims.  See 
Commercial Union Ins. Co. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 393 N.W.2d 161 (Mich. 1986) 
(establishing 12 factors to be considered in determining liability for third-party bad-
faith claims).  Similarly, the courts of Minnesota do not recognize first-party bad 
faith.  See Morris v. Am. Mut. Ins. Co., 386 N.W.2d 233 (Minn. 1986); Haagenson v. 
Nat’l Farmers Union Prop. & Cas. Co., 277 N.W.2d 648, 652 (Minn. 1979) 
(“Minnesota . . . follows the traditional rule that bad faith breach of contract does 
not convert the breach of contract into a tort.”).  However, Minnesota does 
recognize third-party bad faith.  See, e.g., Short v. Dairyland Ins. Co., 334 N.W.2d 384 
(Minn. 1993). 
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the attorney-client privilege.  The nature and scope of the advice-of-
counsel defense is explored. 
In Part III.E., the changing boundaries of waiver by implication 
are examined in light of three leading cases.  The courts in Delaware, 
Arizona, and Ohio have expanded the waiver-by-implication rule 
substantially in recent years.  As a result of this expansion, uncertainty 
exists as to when a waiver by implication will occur in the context of 
insurance company bad faith.  This uncertainty may have a chilling 
effect upon the advice that insurance companies seek from counsel.  
The courts throughout the country have consistently held that an 
insurance company’s mere denial of a bad-faith allegation is not 
sufficient to waive attorney-client privilege.  Recent cases suggest, 
however, that an insurance company can lose the protection of the 
attorney-client privilege simply because the opposing party raises an 
issue to which advice of counsel may be relevant, including 
allegations of bad faith. 
II.  AN OVERVIEW OF INSURANCE BAD-FAITH PRINCIPLES 
As a concept, bad faith, like negligence, must be considered in a 
specific context because it has no definite independent meaning.15  
The court in Wallbrook Insurance Co. v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Co.16 
made the following insightful observation: 
 Insurers are required to act with good faith in dealings with 
their insureds.  The courts of this state recognize that the concept 
of good faith possesses “an intangible and abstract quality with no 
technical meaning.”  One commentator sees the idea of good 
faith as having “no definite meaning of its own,” but is commonly 
illustrated in a negative fashion, “by explaining what it is not.”  
Coming to the same conclusion, another observer notes that good 
faith “is a phrase which has no general meaning or meanings of 
its own, but which serves to exclude many heterogeneous forms of 
 
 15 See James C. Nielsen, Advice of Counsel in Insurance Bad Faith Litigation: A 
Substantive Framework for Pleading, Discovery and Proof, 25 TORT & INS. L.J. 533, 534-35 
(1990).  Commentators have offered varying reviews of how many standards of bad 
faith exist.  For an analysis of how commentators have offered various opinions on 
the standard to determine bad faith, see Lane Christine Boyarski, The Best Place, 
Inc. v. Pan America Insurance Co.: Hawai’i Bad Faith Cause of Action for Insurer 
Misconduct, 19 U. HAW. L. REV. 845, 853-54 (1997).  For a description of the creation 
of the tort of insurance company bad faith, see Henderson, supra note 4, at 22-26.  See 
also Thomas A. Diamond & Howard Foss, Proposed Standards for Evaluating When the 
Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing Has Been Violated: A Framework for Resolving the 
Mystery, 47 HASTINGS L.J. 585, 585-86 (1996) (describing the difficulty in determining 
when the implied covenant of good faith had been violated). 
 16 7 Cal. Rptr. 2d 513 (Ct. App. 1992). 
  
2004 ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE & WAIVER 519 
bad faith. . . . In a particular context the phrase takes on specific 
meaning, but usually this is only by way of contrast with the 
specific form of bad faith actually or hypothetically ruled out.”  
Looking to define bad faith is hardly less frustrating, for it too is 
recognized as an “amorphous concept” which “necessarily varies 
with the context” and thus has “no generally accepted ‘correct’ 
definition.” 
 As may be gathered, the issue of whether good faith was 
exercised covers a broad range of territory. . . . [D]ecisions of the 
Courts of Appeal have established that the litmus of good 
faith/bad faith is to be tested against the background of the 
totality of the circumstances in which the insurer’s disputed 
actions occurred.17 
The tort of bad faith has been described as a hybrid cause of 
action, sharing elements of both a negligence action and an 
intentional tort.18  The tort is composed of two essential elements.  
The first element—whether the insurance company acted reasonably 
toward its insured—is based upon a simple, objective negligence 
standard.19  The second element—whether the insurance company 
acted knowingly20—is a subjective determination.  The introduction 
 
 17 Id. at 518. 
 18 Trus Joist Corp. v. Safeco Ins. Co. of Am., 735 P.2d 125, 134 (Ariz. Ct. App. 
1986). 
 19 The concept of bad faith requires more than negligence to support judgment 
by the insurance company.  Centennial Ins. Co. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 404 N.E.2d 
759 (Ohio 1980).  “It imports a dishonest purpose, more obliquity, conscious 
wrongdoing, breach of a known duty through some ulterior motive or ill-will 
partaking of the nature of fraud.”  Id. at 762.  The requirement of more than mere 
negligence is supported by the holdings in many published decisions.  See, e.g., Gen. 
Star Nat’l Ins. Co. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 960 F.2d 377, 380 (3rd Cir. 1992) 
(interpreting New York law); White v. Cont’l Gen. Ins. Co., 831 F. Supp. 1545, 1555 
(D. Wyo. 1993); Turner Constr. Co. v. First Indem. of Am. Ins. Co., 829 F. Supp. 752, 
762-64 (E.D. Pa. 1993); Matt v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 798 F. Supp. 429, 434 (W.D. Ky. 
1991), aff’d, 968 F.2d 1215 (6th Cir. 1992) (interpreting Kentucky law); Ins. Co. of N. 
Am. v. Citizens Bank of Thomasville, 491 So. 2d 880, 882 (Ala. 1986); First Marine 
Ins. Co. v. Booth, 876 S.W.2d 255, 257 (Ark. 1994); Dolan v. AID Ins. Co., 431 
N.W.2d 790, 794 (Iowa 1988); Wittmer v. Jones, 864 S.W.2d 885, 890-92 (Ky. 1993); 
Universal Life Ins. Co. v. Veasley, 610 So. 2d 290, 295 (Miss. 1992); Ganaway v. 
Shelter Mut. Ins. Co., 795 S.W.2d 554, 556 (Mo. Ct. App. 1990); see also Mission Ins. 
Co. v. Aetna Life & Cas. Co., 687 F. Supp. 249, 253 (E.D. La. 1988) (requiring 
“something more than mere error of judgment” to show insurer bad faith).  
However, a minority of states apply a negligence standard.  See, e.g., Mock v. Mich. 
Millers Mut. Ins. Co., 5 Cal. Rptr. 2d 594, 607 (Ct. App. 1992); Ind. Ins. Co. v. 
Plummer Power Mower & Tool Rental, Inc., 590 N.E.2d 1085, 1093 (Ind. Ct. App. 
1992); Hartford Cas. Ins. Co. v. N.H. Ins. Co., 628 N.E.2d 14, 17 (Mass. 1994); 
Gelinas v. Metro. Prop. & Liab. Ins. Co., 551 A.2d 962, 966 (N.H. 1988); Shamblin v. 
Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 396 S.E.2d 766, 776 (W. Va. 1990). 
 20 It is the unreasonableness of the insurance company’s conduct that is the 
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of this second element of knowledge is what elevates the cause of 
action to a quasi-intentional tort. 
The first, negligence-based element of the tort acts as a 
threshold test for bad-faith actions.21  It is well established that 
“[w]here an insurer acts reasonably, there can be no bad faith.”22  
The court in Trus Joist Corp. v. Safeco Insurance Co. of America gave an 
excellent exposition of this concept: 
[D]id the insurance company act in a manner consistent with the 
way a reasonable insurer would be expected to act under the 
circumstances[?]  This is the threshold test for all bad faith 
actions, whether first or third-party.  Where an insurer acts 
reasonably, there can be no bad faith.  However, the converse of 
this proposition is not necessarily true: merely because an insurer 
acts unreasonably does not mean that it is guilty of bad faith.  
Negligent conduct which results solely from honest mistake, 
oversight, or carelessness does not necessarily create bad faith 
liability even though it may be objectively unreasonable.  Some 
form of consciously unreasonable conduct is required.23 
Where an insurance company intentionally denies, fails to 
process, or refuses to pay a claim without a reasonable basis for such 
action, the tort of bad faith may arise.24  Insurance companies are 
 
essence of the tort.  See Tomaselli v. Transamerica Ins. Co., 31 Cal. Rptr. 2d 433 (Ct. 
App. 1994); Chester v. State Farm Ins. Co., 789 P.2d 534, 537 (Idaho Ct. App. 1990); 
Alsobrook v. Nat’l Travelers Life Ins. Co., 852 P.2d 768, 770 (Okla. Ct. App. 1992).  
The focus is upon the actual knowledge of the insurance company that its conduct 
was unreasonable or whether the company should have known that it was acting 
unreasonably.  See, e.g., Galusha v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 844 F. Supp. 1401, 1404 (D. 
Colo. 1994); Turner v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 614 So. 2d 1029, 1032 (Ala. 1993); 
Ness v. W. Sec. Life Ins. Co., 851 P.2d 122, 125 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1992); Brown v. 
Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 513 N.W.2d 762, 763 (Iowa 1994); Weatherly v. Blue Cross Blue 
Shield Ins. Co., 513 N.W.2d 347, 354 (Neb. Ct. App. 1994); Transp. Ins. Co. v. 
Moriel, 879 S.W.2d 10, 18 (Tex. 1994). 
 21 Trus Joist, 735 P.2d at 134. 
 22 Id. 
 23 Id. (citation omitted).  Thus, mere negligence or inadvertence is insufficient to 
establish the cause of action.  Rawlings v. Apodaca, 726 P.2d 565, 576 (Ariz. 1986).  
The court in Rawlings observed: 
Insurance companies, like other enterprises and all human beings, are 
far from perfect.  Papers get lost, telephone messages misplaced and 
claims ignored because paper-work was misfiled or improperly 
processed.  Such isolated mischances may result in a claim being 
unpaid or delayed.  None of these mistakes will ordinarily constitute a 
breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, even 
though the company may render itself liable for at least nominal 
damages for breach of contract in failing to pay the claim. 
Id. at 573. 
 24 Noble v. Nat’l Am. Life Ins. Co., 624 P.2d 866, 867 (Ariz. 1981); Anderson v. 
Cont’l Ins. Co., 271 N.W.2d 368 (Wis. 1978). 
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permitted, however, to challenge claims that are “fairly debatable.”25  
An examination of the circumstances surrounding the claim 
presentation should be made.26  A claim is typically “fairly debatable” 
where there remain unanswered material questions involving law or 
fact that provide an explanation for the insurance company’s delay or 
refusal to pay a claim.27  The presence of a legitimate coverage 
defense to a claim submission may preclude bad faith.28  Claims may 
be denied on the basis of a “fairly debatable” policy interpretation, 
 
 25 Jordan v. Union Ins. Co., 771 F. Supp. 1031, 1033 (D.S.D. 1991) (stating that 
insurer is entitled to challenge fairly debatable claims); Dirks v. Farm Bureau Mut. 
Ins. Co., 465 N.W.2d 857, 861 (Iowa 1991) (same); see also Ward v. Fireman’s Fund 
Ins. Cos., 731 P.2d 106 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1986).  Numerous courts have articulated a 
“fairly debatable” standard in insurance bad-faith cases.  See, e.g., Davis v. Cotton 
States Mut. Ins. Co., 604 So. 2d 354, 358 (Ala. 1982); Deese v. State Farm Mut. Auto. 
Ins. Co., 838 P.2d 1265, 1268 (Ariz. 1992); Garnett v. Transamerica Ins. Servs., 800 
P.2d 656, 666 (Idaho 1990); Nassen v. Nat’l State Ins. Co., 494 N.W.2d 231, 236 (Iowa 
1992), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 1031 (1993); Pickett v. Lloyds of London, 621 A.2d 445, 
453 (N.J. 1993); Tokles & Son, Inc. v. Midwestern Indem. Co., 605 N.E.2d 936, 943 
(Ohio 1992); Bartlett v. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co., 538 A.2d 997, 1000 (R.I. 
1988); In re Certification of a Question of Law from the U.S. Dist. Court of S.D., W. 
Div. (Champion v. U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co.), 399 N.W.2d 320, 324 (S.D. 1987); 
Newhouse v. Citizens Sec. Mut. Ins. Co., 501 N.W.2d 1, 5-6 (Wis. 1993); First Wyo. 
Bank, N.A. v. Cont’l Ins. Co., 860 P.2d 1094, 1101 (Wyo. 1993). 
Courts have differed in defining and interpreting “fair debatability.”  As an 
example, the Alabama Supreme Court in National Savings Life Insurance Co. v. Dutton, 
419 So. 2d 1357 (Ala. 1982), found that where there is a genuine issue of law with 
respect to the insurance company’s denial of a claim, which precluded a directed 
verdict for the insured, the insurance company was entitled to a directed verdict on 
the issue of bad faith.  However, the Dutton rule, which gave rise to the so-called 
directed verdict test of bad faith, has been rejected by other courts.  See, e.g., Bilden v. 
United Equitable Ins. Co., 921 F.2d 822, 829 (8th Cir. 1990) (interpreting North 
Dakota Law); Linthicum v. Nationwide Life Ins. Co., 723 P.2d 703, 711-12 (Ariz. Ct. 
App. 1985), aff’d in part and rev’d in part, 723 P.2d 675 (Ariz. 1986). 
 26 Forcucci v. U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co., 11 F.3d 1, 2 (1st Cir. 1993). 
Courts have differed regarding the point in time that becomes relevant for 
purposes of assessing whether the insurance company had reasonable grounds for 
denying the claim.  A significant number of courts have stated that they will only 
consider evidence available to the insurance company at the time of the denial.  See, 
e.g., Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Lavoie, 505 So. 2d 1050, 1053 (Ala. 1987).  However, some 
courts inquire as to whether the insurance company had a fairly debatable reason for 
denying the claim based on the facts presented at trial.  See, e.g., Mass. Bay Ins. Co. v. 
Hall, 395 S.E.2d 851, 857 (Ga. Ct. App. 1990).  One commentator has opined that 
insurance companies should not be permitted to meet the standards by putting forth 
grounds recognized after the denial of a claim.  See Chris M. Kallianos, Survey, Bad 
Faith Refusal to Pay First-Party Insurance Claims: A Growing Recognition of Extra-Contract 
Damages, 64 N.C. L. REV. 1421, 1435 (1986). 
 27 See Larson v. Allstate Ins. Co., 857 P.2d 263, 266 (Utah Ct. App.) (stating that 
questions of law and fact can make a claim fairly debatable), cert. denied, 862 P.2d 
1356 (Utah 1993). 
 28 First Dakota Nat’l Bank v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 2 F.3d 801, 811-12 
(8th Cir. 1993). 
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even though that interpretation ultimately may be rejected by the 
courts.29  Insurance companies may litigate issues of first impression30 
by filing a declaratory judgment action without being exposed to bad 
faith.31  If the insurer learns that the legal authority previously relied 
upon does not continue to support its coverage position, however, it 
may be required to change its position promptly and resolve the 
claim.32 
Insurance companies cannot employ deceptive practices or 
make deliberate misrepresentations to avoid paying claims.33  They 
cannot deliberately misinterpret records or policy language to avoid 
coverage.34  Instead, insurance companies must perform an adequate 
investigation in determining the claim, or else risk bad-faith liability 
arising from an improper claim denial.35  They must avoid 
unreasonable delay in resolving a claim.36  Insurance companies must 
litigate the claim if litigation is required to resolve a coverage 
dispute.37 
The linchpin of the tort of bad faith is the “covenant of good 
 
 29 See Mills v. Regent Ins. Co., 449 N.W.2d 294, 297 (Wis. Ct. App. 1989), review 
denied, 451 N.W.2d 297 (Wis. 1990).  Where open legal questions remain, an 
insurance company may be insulated from bad faith.  See Aceves v. Allstate Ins. Co., 
827 F. Supp. 1473, 1484 (S.D. Cal. 1993); Frost v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 828 S.W.2d 
915, 920 (Mo. Ct. App. 1992); J.H. France Refractories Co. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 626 
A.2d 502, 510 (Pa. 1993). 
 30 See, e.g., First Fin. Ins. Co. v. Rainey, 401 S.E.2d 490, 491-92 (Ga. 1991); 
Armacost v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 644 P.2d 403, 405-06 (Kan. 1982); 
Pressman v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 574 A.2d 757, 758-60 (R.I. 1990); Cuna Mut. Ins. 
Soc’y v. Norman, 375 S.E.2d 724, 725-27 (Va. 1989). 
 31 Wierck v. Grinnel Mut. Reins. Co., 456 N.W.2d 191, 194 (Iowa 1990); Ballinger 
v. Sec. Conn. Life Ins. Co., 862 P.2d 68, 70 (Okla. 1993).  An insurance company is 
not in bad faith for litigating an issue of first impression. 
 32 See, e.g., Harrington v. Guar. Nat’l Ins. Co., 628 So. 2d 323, 326-27 (Ala. 1993). 
 33 See, e.g., Indep. Life & Accident Ins. Co. v. Peavy, 528 So. 2d 1112, 1114 (Miss. 
1988); Banker’s Life & Cas. Co. v. Crenshaw, 483 So. 2d 254, 270-73 (Miss. 1985), 
aff’d, 486 U.S. 71 (1988); Timmons v. Royal Globe Ins. Co., 653 P.2d 907, 910-11 
(Okla. 1982); State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Gros, 818 S.W.2d 908, 912-13 (Tex. App. 
1991); Hampton v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 778 S.W.2d 476, 479 (Tex. App. 
1989). 
 34 See, e.g., Hall v. Svea Mut. Ins. Co., 493 N.E.2d 1102, 1104-05 (Ill. App. Ct. 
1986). 
 35 See, e.g., Standard Plan, Inc. v. Tucker, 582 So. 2d 1024, 1030-32 (Ala. 1991); 
Morgan v. Golden Rule Ins. Co., 568 So. 2d 184, 188-89 (La. Ct. App. 1990); Indus. 
Indem. Co. of the Northwest, Inc. v. Kallevig, 792 P.2d 520, 526-28 (Wash. 1990). 
 36 See, e.g., Filaski v. Preferred Risk Mut. Ins. Co., 734 P.2d 76, 83 (Ariz. 1987) 
(noting that there were months of delay which included “such dilatory tactics as not 
returning insured’s phone calls, ignoring her pleas for personal assistance in 
completing forms, repeating requests which the insured had already complied with, 
and rejecting her claims but providing no reason for doing so”). 
 37 See White v. W. Title Ins. Co., 710 P.2d 309, 316-17 (Cal. 1985). 
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faith and fair dealing,” which is implied by law and imputed into all 
insurance policies.38  The implied covenant of good faith and fair 
dealing is often expressed as a promise implied in all contracts “that 
neither party will do anything which will injure the right of the other 
to receive the benefits of the agreement.”39  A primary benefit flowing 
from the insurance company’s express agreement to protect its 
insured from covered calamities “is the insured’s expectation that his 
insurance company will not wrongfully deprive him of the very 
security for which he bargained or expose him to the catastrophe 
from which he sought protection.”40 
A breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing can 
occur notwithstanding the insurance company’s payment of full 
policy benefits due on a particular claim.41  The focus of the inquiry is 
 
 38 See Kan. Bankers Sur. Co. v. Lynass, 920 F.2d 546, 548 (8th Cir. 1990); State 
Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Weiford, 831 P.2d 1264, 1266 (Alaska 1992); Walter v. 
Simmons, 818 P.2d 214, 223 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1991); Pemberton v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 
858 P.2d 380, 382 (Nev. 1993); Pavia v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 626 N.E.2d 
24, 27 (N.Y. 1993); Austin Co. v. Royal Ins. Co., 842 S.W.2d 608, 610 (Tenn. Ct. App. 
1992).  The implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing can be traced back as far 
as the late nineteenth century.  See Germania Ins. Co. v. Redwig, 80 Ky. 223, 235 
(1882); see also Brassil v. Md. Cas. Co., 104 N.E. 622, 624 (N.Y. 1914); Neal A. 
Goldberg et al., Can the Puzzle Be Solved: Are Punitive Damages Awardable in New York for 
First Party Bad Faith?, 44 SYRACUSE L. REV. 723, 727 (1993).  The implied covenant of 
good faith and fair dealing is an outgrowth of society’s promotion of reliance on 
contracts, and fairness and reasonableness in contractual relationships, which has 
formed the public policy of a particular state.  See Koehrer v. Superior Court, 226 Cal. 
Rptr. 820, 828 (Ct. App. 1986). 
 39 Comunale v. Traders & Gen. Ins. Co., 328 P.2d 198, 200 (Cal. 1958); see also 
Wagonseller v. Scottsdale Mem’l Hosp., 710 P.2d 1025, 1038 (Ariz. 1985). 
A few courts have described the duties that an insurance company owes its 
insured as those of a fiduciary.  See, e.g., Frommoethelydo v. Fire Ins. Exch., 721 P.2d 
41, 44 (Cal. 1986) (stating that because insurance companies hold themselves out as 
such, they are fiduciaries); Bonke v. Mukwonago-Vernon Mut. Ins. Co., 329 N.W.2d 
243, 248 (Wis. Ct. App. 1982) (declaring that insurance companies have “a fiduciary 
duty to act on behalf of” their insureds as if their own interests were at stake).  Other 
courts, however, have characterized the relationship as confidential and have 
imposed quasi-fiduciary duties on the insurance company.  Typically, courts have 
prescribed an obligation which describes the duty as “fiduciary in nature.”  See 
Hassard, Bonnington, Roger & Huber v. Home Ins. Co., 740 F. Supp. 789, 792 (S.D. 
Cal. 1990) (“[T]he relationship between an insurer and an insured has many of the 
elements of a fiduciary relationship, but is not an actual fiduciary relationship.”); 
Love v. Fire Ins. Exch., 271 Cal. Rptr. 246, 251-52 (Ct. App. 1990) (stating that an 
insurance company’s obligation is “akin to fiduciary-type responsibilities”); Tynes v. 
Bankers Life Co., 730 P.2d 1115, 1125-26 (Mont. 1986).  But see William T. Baker et 
al., Is an Insurer a Fiduciary to Its Insureds?, 25 TORT & INS. L.J. 1, 1-2 (1989) (arguing 
that insurance companies are not fiduciaries). 
 40 Rawlings, 726 P.2d at 571. 
 41 The Arizona Supreme Court has observed: 
Failure to perform the express covenant to pay the claim is not the sine 
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not whether a specific express provision of the insurance policy has 
been breached by the insurer, but instead, whether the company’s 
conduct damaged “the very protection or security which the insured 
sought to gain by buying insurance.”42  When conduct is found to be 
designed to deprive the policyholder of the benefits of the contract, 
bad faith may exist, notwithstanding mere technical compliance with 
the literal terms of the contract, because the remedies available may 
be insufficient, undermining public policy.43  Courts differ on 
whether a breach of the covenant can be sustained in the absence of 
specific coverage.44 
Insurance bad-faith actions are generally classified as either first- 
or third-party claims.  This classification is based upon the type of 
insurance coverage provided by the policy in question.  Where the 
insurance company contracts to pay benefits directly to the insured, a 
first-party coverage situation arises.  Examples of first-party coverage 
include health and accident, life, disability, homeowner’s, fire, title, 
and property damage insurance.  In contrast, when the insurance 
 
qua non for an action for breach of the implied covenant of good faith 
and fair dealing.  To characterize the cases otherwise, would, in effect, 
construe them to hold that any breach of the express covenant would 
give rise to the tort action for bad faith.  We hold explicitly that such a 
result is not permitted.  Not every breach of an express covenant in an 
insurance contract is a breach of the covenant of good faith and fair 
dealing. 
Id. at 573. 
 42 Id.  Compare Paul E.B. Glad et al., Bad Faith Liability in the Absence of Coverage?, 7 
BAD FAITH L. REP. 1 (1991) (arguing that no bad-faith liability can exist absent 
coverage except in extraordinary cases), with Stephan S. Ashley, Bad Faith Liability in 
the Absence of Coverage: A Response, 7 BAD FAITH L. REP. 6 (1991) (explaining that “the 
law does not preclude bad faith in the absence of coverage”). 
 43 See, e.g., St. Benedict’s Dev. Co. v. St. Benedict’s Hosp., 811 P.2d 194, 198-200 
(Utah 1991).  One court has observed that tort liability in this context requires more 
than the intent to breach the contract or the intent to deprive the policyholder of 
benefits.  See, e.g., Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Noble Lowndes Int’l, Inc., 600 N.Y.S.2d 212, 
214-15 (App. Div. 1993).  Several jurisdictions have rejected tort-based remedies for 
breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing.  These jurisdictions 
have allowed recovery of consequential economic damages for breach of contract by 
the insurance company.  See, e.g., Marquis v. Farm Family Mut. Ins. Co., 628 A.2d 644, 
650-52 (Me. 1993); Lawton v. Great Southwest Fire Ins. Co., 392 A.2d 576, 579-81 
(N.H. 1978); see also Olson v. Rugloski, 277 N.W.2d 385, 387-88 (Minn. 1979).  Other 
jurisdictions have substantially blurred the tort-contract distinction in the area of 
consequential damages.  See, e.g., Evra Corp. v. Swiss Bank Corp., 673 F.2d 951, 957 
(7th Cir.), cert denied, 459 U.S. 1017 (1982). 
 44 Compare Harbor Ins. Co. v. Urban Constr. Co., 990 F.2d 195, 202 (5th Cir. 
1993) (holding that absence of coverage, alone, did not preclude recovery for breach 
of the implied covenant), with McMillan Scripts N. P’ship v. Royal Ins. Co. of Am., 23 
Cal. Rptr. 2d 243, 247 (Ct. App. 1993) (holding that where no loss covered by policy 
occurred, there was no breach of the implied covenant). 
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company contracts to indemnify the insured against liability to third 
parties, a third-party coverage situation exists.  The type of claim is 
not determined by the identity of the party bringing the bad-faith 
action against the insurance company.  For example, a third-party 
action might be brought by the insured in the event that he or she is 
subjected to excess liability by reason of the insurance company’s 
bad-faith refusal to settle.  In that event, the standards applicable to 
third-party claims would govern the action, although it was brought 
by the insured, rather than a third-party assignee. 
Both first- and third-party bad-faith claims derive from the same 
duty—the duty of good faith and fair dealing.  The two actions, 
however, involve different factual circumstances and distinct 
considerations for the insurance company.  Ordinarily, a first-party 
claim involves a coverage dispute between the insurance company 
and its insured.  In this situation the insurance company must not act 
in bad faith to thwart the insured’s reasonable expectations for 
coverage under the policy.  First-party claims do not involve the 
insurance company in defending a legal action brought by a third 
party that could result in financial ruin of the insured. 
A third-party claim, by comparison, includes the additional risk 
of subjecting the insured to liability in excess of the policy limits 
because of the insurance company’s bad-faith refusal to settle within 
those limits.  Typically, the insurance company has exclusive 
authority to accept or reject settlement offers and takes on the 
additional responsibility of defending the claim.45  The duty to accept 
reasonable settlements in third-party situations and the duty not to 
withhold payment of first-party claims “are merely two different 
aspects of the same duty.”46 
Because the risk to the insured and the responsibilities of the 
 
 45 Kallianos, supra note 26, at 1429.  The differences between first-party and third-
party coverage are significant enough that some jurisdictions refuse to recognize 
first-party actions while allowing third-party actions.  See, e.g., Spencer v. Aetna Life & 
Cas. Ins. Co., 611 P.2d 149, 155-58 (Kan. 1980); Lawton, 392 A.2d at 580-81.  The 
Supreme Court of New Hampshire noted: 
The dilemma presented by the absolute control of trial and settlement 
vested in the insurer by the insurance contract and the conflicting 
interests of the insurer and insured in the third-party claim requires 
that the insurer recognize the conflict and give due regard to the 
interest of the insured.  This dilemma is lacking in the first-party claim.  
The insurer is not in a position to expose the insured to a judgment in 
excess of the policy limits through its unreasonable refusal to settle a 
case, nor is it in a position to otherwise injure the insured by virtue of 
its exclusive control over the defense of the case. 
Id. at 581 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). 
 46 Gruenberg v. Aetna Ins. Co., 510 P.2d 1032, 1037 (Cal. 1973). 
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insurance company are distinguishable in first- and third-party claims, 
the applicable standard of conduct is necessarily different.  In the 
first-party situation, the insurance company breaches the implied 
duty of good faith and fair dealing if it (1) acts unreasonably towards 
its insured, and (2) acts knowingly or with reckless disregard as to the 
reasonableness of its actions.  Under this standard, an insurance 
company can challenge a claim that is “fairly debatable.”  In third-
party cases, determining whether the insurance company has acted in 
bad faith by refusing to settle a claim brought by a third party 
requires an equal consideration of the comparative hazards.  This 
standard of reasonableness requires that the insurance company 
consider various factors,47 one of which is the relative strength of the 
claim by the third party against the insured.  Although the 
debatability of the claim may be an issue as to liability and damages, it 
is not determinative.  The insurance company must also weigh other 
considerations, such as the financial risk to the insured in the event 
of a judgment in excess of the policy limits.48  The test for 
determining whether the insurer has appropriately considered the 
interests of the insured is “whether a prudent insurer without policy 
limits would have accepted the settlement offer.”49  In third-party 
situations, the insured bears a disproportionate share of the risk if the 
insurance company, in exercising its exclusive control over 
settlement, fails to accept a reasonable settlement offer within policy 
limits.  The insured faces personal liability for an award exceeding 
the policy limits, while the insurance company’s potential liability 
remains constant—it cannot exceed the policy limits.50 
 
 47 The Arizona Supreme Court, in General Accident Fire & Life Assurance Corp. v. 
Little, 443 P.2d 690 (Ariz. 1968), delineated several factors to be considered by the 
court in assessing whether the insurance company has treated the insured’s interest 
with an equality of consideration: 
[1] the strength of the injured claimant’s case on the issues of liability 
and damages; [2] attempts by the insurer to induce the insured to 
contribute to a settlement; [3] failure of the insurer to properly 
investigate the circumstances so as to ascertain the evidence against the 
insured; [4] the insurer’s rejection of advice of its own attorney or 
agent; [5] failure of the insurer to inform the insured of a compromise 
offer; [6] [t]he amount of financial risk to which each party is exposed 
in the event of a refusal to settle; [7] the fault of the insured in 
inducing the insurer’s rejection of the compromise offer by misleading 
it as to the facts; and [8] any other factors tending to establish or 
negate bad faith on the part of the insurer. 
Id. at 694 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Brown v. Guar. Ins. Co., 319 
P.2d 69, 75 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1958)). 
 48 Id. 
 49 Crisci v. Sec. Ins. Co., 426 P.2d 173, 176 (Cal. 1967). 
 50 The court in In re Allstate Insurance Co., 722 S.W.2d 947 (Mo. 1987), has 
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III.  ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE AND INSURER BAD FAITH 
A. General Overview of the Privilege 
The attorney-client privilege protects communications between 
the attorney and the client.51  The purpose of the attorney-client 
 
delineated the context in which litigation decisions are made and how these create a 
vulnerability with regard to the insured: 
The insurer has the contract right to direct the litigation. . . . It may 
evaluate claims and decide whether to settle. . . . It may make economic 
decisions without the assent of the insured.  The insured may want a 
quick settlement to eliminate further demands on time and energy, but 
the insurer does not have to settle unless a satisfactory offer is 
forthcoming. Or the insurer may accept a settlement offer even though 
the insured wants to go to trial to establish freedom from fault.  The 
insurer may decide what to spend in defense, what discovery is to be 
had, and what experts to hire.  It also has the right to select counsel to 
defend its interests. 
Id. at 952.  The vulnerability of the insured which arises through the insurance 
company’s control of the defense is exemplified by several cases.  See, e.g., Betts v. 
Allstate Ins. Co., 201 Cal. Rptr. 528, 546 (Ct. App. 1984) (noting that insurance 
company’s appointed defense attorney took advantage of the insured by “actively 
working to protect [the insurance company] and persisting in manipulating [the 
insured] against her own best interests”); Rosenzweig v. Blimshteyn, 544 N.Y.S.2d 
865, 867 (App. Div. 1989) (defense counsel appointed by the insurance carrier 
adopted a defense to avoid the payment of any monies by the insurance company, 
regardless of the consequences to the insureds who were his “ostensible clients”). 
 51 Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 389 (1981).  The traditional 
elements of the attorney-client privilege that identify communications that may be 
protected from disclosure and discovery are: 
(1) the asserted holder of the privilege is or sought to become a client; 
(2) the person to whom the communication was made (a) is a member 
of the bar or a court, or his or her subordinate, and (b) in connection 
with this communication is acting as a lawyer; (3) the communication 
relates to a fact of which the attorney was informed (a) by his client, 
(b) without the presence of strangers, (c) for the purpose of securing 
primarily either (i) an opinion of law or (ii) legal services or (iii) 
assistance in some legal proceeding, and (d) not for the purpose of 
committing a crime or tort; and (4) the privilege has been (a) claimed 
and (b) not waived by the client. 
In re Grand Jury Investigation, 599 F.2d 1224, 1233 (3d Cir. 1979) (citing United 
States v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 89 F. Supp. 357, 358-59 (D. Mass. 1950)).  The 
attorney-client privilege has been extended to third-party agents of a client or its 
counsel under certain circumstances.  See, e.g., United States v. Kovel, 296 F.2d 918, 
922 (2d Cir. 1961).  Under Kovel, “voluntarily disclosing the information contained 
in the [privileged] documents to nonparties waives the attorney-client privilege, 
unless such disclosure was ‘necessary, or at least highly useful, for the effective 
consultation between the client and the lawyer which the privilege is designed to 
permit.’”  Strougo v. BEA Assocs., 199 F.R.D. 515, 522 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (quoting Kovel, 
296 F.2d at 922).  Based on these principles, courts following Kovel have applied a 
two-step analysis in evaluating whether the attorney-client privilege should be 
extended to third-party agents.  This analysis focuses upon: (1) whether the inclusion 
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privilege is to promote “full and frank communication between 
attorneys and their clients.”52  There are two broad justifications that 
underlie the privilege.  The first justification is that the privilege 
promotes disclosure of all relevant information by the client to 
enable the attorney to effectively represent the client or to give 
adequate legal advice.53  Without the privilege it is presumed that 
many clients would not communicate all relevant information to the 
attorney if adverse parties could use it against them in subsequent 
litigation.  The second justification is that an attorney must be able to 
openly communicate legal advice and strategies to the client in order 
to adequately represent him or her, and that the attorney would not 
engage in such communications if adverse litigants could discover 
them in subsequent litigation.54  Because “sound legal advice or 
advocacy serves public ends,”55 the privilege is necessary to promote 
 
of the third-party agent in the otherwise privileged communications occurs under 
circumstances reflecting the parties’ reasonable expectation that the confidentiality 
of the communications will be maintained, and (2) whether disclosure of the 
otherwise privileged communications to the third-party agent is necessary in order 
for the client to obtain appropriately informed legal advice.  See generally United 
States v. Ackert, 169 F.3d 136, 139-40 (2d Cir. 1999); Constr. Indus. Servs. Corp. v. 
Hanover Ins. Co., 206 F.R.D. 43, 47-48 (S.D.N.Y. 2001); In re Pfohl Bros. Landfill 
Litig., 175 F.R.D. 13, 23-24 (W.D.N.Y. 1997); People v. Osorio, 549 N.E.2d 1183, 
1185-86 (N.Y. 1989); Doe v. Poe, 664 N.Y.S.2d 120, 122 (N.Y. 1989).  In extending the 
scope of the privilege, implicitly or explicitly, the courts have found the disclosure of 
the otherwise privileged communications to the third-party agent to be “necessary” to 
the client’s ability to seek and receive effective legal advice from counsel, and have 
found that the third-party agent was essentially fulfilling a role functionally 
equivalent to that of an integral employee of the client.  See, e.g., Fed. Trade Comm’n 
v. GlaxoSmithKline, 294 F.3d 141, 147-48 (D.C. Cir. 2002); In re Bieter Co., 16 F.3d 
929, 938 (8th Cir. 1997); In re Copper Mkt. Antitrust Litig., 200 F.R.D. 213, 215, 219 
(S.D.N.Y. 2001). 
 52 Upjohn, 499 U.S. at 389. 
 53 Id. (citing Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40, 51 (1980)). 
 54 Id. 
 55 Id.  Despite the beneficial nature of the attorney-client privilege, some courts 
have adopted a strict interpretation to limit its scope.  See, e.g., Cameron v. Gen. 
Motors Corp., 158 F.R.D. 581, 586 (D.S.C. 1994), vacated in part on other grounds sub 
nom. In re Gen. Motors Corp., Case No. 94-2435, 1995 WL 940063 (4th Cir. Feb. 17, 
1995). In Cameron, a non-insurance case, the district court recognized the limited 
nature of the attorney-client privilege and the strict construction and limitations 
governing its application: “Because the attorney-client privilege is an exception from 
the otherwise liberal construction of discovery rules, its use is not favored by federal 
courts.  Therefore, assertions of attorney-client privilege are to be strictly confined 
within the narrowest possible limits consistent with the logic of its principal.”  
Cameron, 158 F.R.D. at 586 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted); see also 
Grand Jury Proceedings Under Seal v. United States, 947 F.2d 1188, 1190 (4th Cir. 
1991) (“[T]he [attorney-client] privilege must be narrowly construed.”); United 
States v. Tedder, 801 F.2d 1437, 1441 (4th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 480 U.S. 938 
(1987); In re Grand Jury Investigation, 599 F.2d at 1235; NLRB v. Harvey, 349 F.2d 900, 
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full and unrestricted communication within the attorney-client 
relationship. 
Courts must work to apply the privilege in ways that are 
predictable and certain in order to serve the interests of justice by 
encouraging consultation with counsel free from the apprehension of 
disclosure.  “An uncertain privilege—or one which purports to be 
certain, but results in widely varying applications by the courts—is 
little better than no privilege.”56  Thus, uncertainty regarding the 
scope of the attorney-client privilege may have an adverse impact.  If 
uncertainty remains, attorneys and their clients will be forced to 
assume that private communications will be subject to discovery, 
essentially eliminating the privilege.57 
 
906 (4th Cir. 1965). 
Evidentiary privileges are an exception to the general rule that relevant evidence 
is admissible.  Privileges forbid the admission of otherwise relevant evidence when 
certain interests the privileges are thought to protect are regarded as more 
important than the interests served by the resolution of litigation based on full 
disclosure of all relevant facts.  However, the privilege forbidding the discovery of 
admission of evidence relating to communications between attorney and client is 
intended to insure that a client remains free from apprehension that consultations 
with a legal advisor will be disclosed.  See Hunt v. Blackburn, 128 U.S. 464, 470 
(1888).  The attorney-client privilege encourages the client to reveal to the lawyer 
confidences necessary for the lawyer to provide advice and representation.  See 
MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 87, at 205 (Edward W. Cleary ed., 3d ed. 1984) (stating 
that lawyers “can act effectively only if they are fully advised of the facts by the parties 
whom they represent”).  Because the privilege serves the interests of justice, courts 
have observed that it is worthy of maximum protection.  Haines v. Liggett Group, 
Inc., 975 F.2d 81, 90 (3d Cir. 1992).  Courts and commentators have supported the 
privilege: 
As long as our society recognizes that advice as to matters relating to 
the law should be given by persons trained in the law – that is, by 
lawyers – anything that materially interferes with that relationship must 
be restricted or eliminated, and anything that fosters the success of that 
relationship must be retained and strengthened.  The relationship and 
the continued existence of the giving of legal advice by persons 
accurately and effectively trained in the law is of greater societal value, 
it is submitted, than the admissibility of a given piece of evidence in a 
particular lawsuit.  Contrary to the implied assertions of the evidence 
authorities, the heavens will not fall if all relevant and competent 
evidence cannot be admitted. 
State ex rel. Great Am. Ins. Co. v. Smith, 574 S.W.2d 379, 383 (Mo. 1978) (quoting 
Robert Allen Sedler & Joseph J. Simeone, Privileges in the Law of Evidence: The Realities 
of Attorney-Client Confidences, 24 OHIO ST. L.J. 1, 3 (1963)). 
 56 In re Von Bulow, 828 F.2d 94, 100 (2d Cir. 1987). 
 57 State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Lee, 13 P.3d 1169, 1187 (Ariz. 2000) 
(McGregor, J., dissenting). 
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B. Commonly Recognized Exceptions to the Privilege and Their 
Application to Bad-Faith Cases 
There are three principal exceptions to the attorney-client 
privilege.  The first exception pertains to crimes and fraud.58  Here, 
the attorney-client privilege is vitiated when the client seeks the 
services of the lawyer to commit a crime or fraud.59  Courts have 
generally found that mere allegations of insurance company bad faith 
do not give rise to the crimes or fraud exception.60  As an example, in 
 
 58 This exception addresses the perpetuation of crimes or other evil enterprises 
that are pursued by a client in concert with his attorney.  See, e.g., United Servs. Auto. 
Ass’n. v. Werley, 526 P.2d 28, 31 (Alaska 1974).  Upon a prima facie showing of fraud, 
the attorney-client privilege is defeated.  Id. at 32.  “Although the fraud or crime 
must have been contemplated by the client at the time of the communication, it is 
irrelevant whether the attorney was aware of the client’s purpose.”  Munn v. Bristol 
Day Hous. Auth., 777 P.2d 188, 195 (Alaska 1989) (citations omitted); see also In re 
Grand Jury Proceedings, 183 F.3d 71, 75-76 (1st Cir. 1999) (explaining that attorney-
client privilege is vitiated when the client seeks the services of the lawyer and uses the 
lawyer to commit a crime or a fraud).  The attorney need not be aware of the client’s 
fraud for the exception to apply.  Caldwell v. Dist. Court, 644 P.2d 26, 33-34 (Colo. 
1982). 
Some jurisdictions have codified the crime or fraud exception.  See, e.g., OR. 
EVID. CODE § 503(4)(a) (2003) (providing that attorney-client privilege does not 
apply “[i]f the services of the lawyer were sought or obtained to enable or aid anyone 
to commit or plan to commit what the client knew or reasonably should have known 
to be a crime or fraud”).  Kansas, like Oregon, has also codified the exception.  See 
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-426(d)(1) (2003).  In Kansas the exception applies where 
communications for legal services are sought in order to enable or aid in the 
commission or planning of the commission of a crime or tort.  See Fairport Int’l 
Exploration, Inc. v. Shipwrecked Vessel, 177 F.3d 491, 501 (D. Kan. 1997); see also 
United States v. Anderson, 85 F. Supp. 2d 1047 (D. Kan. 1999). 
 59 In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 183 F.3d at 75-76. 
 60 Cf. Freedom Trust v. Chubb Group of Ins. Cos., 38 F. Supp. 2d 1170, 1174 
(C.D. Cal. 1999) (applying California law) (stating that exception was not triggered 
merely upon a prima facie showing of bad faith); Gagne v. Ralph Pill Elec. Supply Co., 
114 F.R.D. 22, 25 (D. Me. 1987) (holding that a person seeking discovery in bad-faith 
case must present prima facie evidence of fraud before materials sought will become 
discoverable pursuant to the crime or fraud exception); Riggs v. Schroering, 822 
S.W.2d 414, 415 (Ky. 1991) (finding attorney-client privilege not breached by mere 
allegation of bad faith); Levin v. C.O.M.B. Co., 469 N.W.2d 512, 515 (Minn. Ct. App. 
1991) (while recognizing the crime or fraud exception, noting that “[m]ere 
allegations of wrongdoing are insufficient to warrant application of the exception”). 
A significant number of courts in bad-faith actions have found that once a prima 
facia case or bad-faith refusal to pay has been established, the attorney-client privilege 
between an insurance company and its attorneys is abrogated.  See Silva v. Fire Ins. 
Exch., 112 F.R.D. 699, 700 (D. Mont. 1996); In re Bergeson, 112 F.R.D 692, 697-98 
(D. Mont. 1986); Escalante v. Sentry Ins. Co., 743 P.2d 832, 842-43 (Wash. Ct. App. 
1987).  The court in Werley, 526 P.2d 28, held that where the attorney is involved in a 
bad-faith attempt to defeat or reduce coverage, the invocation of the attorney-client 
privilege in such bad-faith dealings would be inappropriate.  Id. at 33.  Such conduct 
constitutes “civil fraud.”  Id.  See generally BARRY R. OSTRAGER & THOMAS R. NEWMAN, 
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Guaranty National Insurance Co. v. George,61 the insured sought the 
production of an opinion letter written by counsel for the insurance 
company.  The Kentucky Court of Appeals concluded that the 
opinion letter was protected by the attorney-client privilege and was, 
therefore, not discoverable “in the absence of any evidence indicating 
the contemplation of a tortious act on behalf of [the insurance 
company].”62  The court stated, “To develop an exception in bad faith 
cases against insurers would impede the free flow of information and 
honest evaluation of claims.  In the absence of fraud or criminal 
activity, an insurer is entitled to the attorney-client privilege to the 
same extent as other litigants.”63 
The Washington Court of Appeals, in Escalante v. Sentry Insurance 
Co.,64 provided some further guidance in this area.  In cases of alleged 
insurer bad faith, the court held that the attorney-client privilege 
does not apply when the documents sought to be protected “pertain 
to ongoing or future fraudulent conduct by the insurer.”65  In 
extending the civil fraud exception to the attorney-client privilege to 
cases implicating insurance company misconduct, the court in 
Escalante established a two-part test to determine whether fraudulent 
conduct by the insurance company occurred, and whether that 
conduct was sufficient to overcome the privilege.66  First, the trial 
court must determine whether there was “a factual showing adequate 
to support a good faith belief by a reasonable person that wrongful 
conduct sufficient to invoke the . . . fraud exception . . . has 
occurred.”67  Second, if the trial court finds the requisite factual 
showing has been made, the requested documents are subjected to 
an in camera inspection, at the trial court’s discretion, to determine 
whether there is a “foundation in fact” to overcome the privilege 
 
HANDBOOK ON INSURANCE COVERAGE DISPUTES § 10.11 (4th ed. 1991). 
 61 953 S.W.2d 946 (Ky. 1997). 
 62 Id. at 948. 
 63 Id. (quoting the Kentucky Court of Appeals); see also State ex rel. United States 
Fid. & Guar. Co. v. Mont. Secondary Judicial Court, 783 P.2d 911, 916 (Mont. 1989) 
(“An insurance company must have an honest and candid evaluation of the case, 
possibly including a ‘worse case scenario.’  A concern by the attorney that 
communications would be discoverable in a [third-party] bad faith suit would 
certainly chill open and honest communication . . . . It could also impede 
settlements.”). 
 64 743 P.2d 832 (Wash. Ct. App. 1987), review denied, 109 Wash. 2d 1025 (1988). 
 65 Id. at 842. 
 66 Id. at 843. 
 67 Id. at 842-43 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Caldwell, 644 P.2d at 
33). 
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based upon civil fraud.68 
The second exception to the attorney-client privilege 
encompasses the legal capacity doctrine: the nature of the work 
 
 68 Escalante, 743 P.2d at 842.  The Escalante civil fraud exception test was applied 
by the court in Barry v. USAA, 989 P.2d 1172, 1176 (Wash. Ct. App. 1999).  After the 
tortfeasor’s automobile liability insurance company paid its policy limits, the insured 
sought underinsured motorist benefits under her own policy.  The insured hired her 
own attorney to pursue the claim.  Following several months of delay in the 
processing of the claim, the insured filed an action against the insurer alleging bad 
faith and consumer protection violations.  The insured sought discovery of reports 
from the claims adjuster and correspondence from the insurance company’s 
attorney who handled the underinsured motorist claim.  Id. at 1174.  The court 
applied the two-part test set out in Escalante.  First, the trial court in Barry reviewed 
the case file and found that the insured had failed to establish sufficient wrongful 
conduct to invoke the civil fraud exception.  The trial court therefore refused to 
exercise its discretionary right to inspect the privileged documents in camera.  On 
appeal the trial court’s decision was affirmed.  The appellate court could not 
conclude that the trial court’s exercise of discretion was “manifestly unreasonable or 
based on untenable grounds.”  Id. at 1177. 
The Escalante test was recently questioned by an unpublished decision of the 
Washington Court of Appeals.  In In re Azula, No. 46314-4-I, 2001 Wash. App. LEXIS 
219 (Wash. Ct. App. Feb. 5, 2001), the court held that an in camera review of relevant 
documents is mandatory where disclosure of evidence is opposed on the basis of a 
privilege, insisting that such review “is the only way a court can determine whether a 
document is exempt from disclosure or sufficiently relevant to even merit 
disclosure.”  Id. at *3.  The Azula court noted that Barry and Escalante, which allowed 
discretionary review in such situations, are “inconsistent with Washington Supreme 
Court holdings, resulting from their mistaken reliance on Colorado law.”  Id. at *3 
n.1. 
The Washington court in Escalante relied heavily upon the analysis of the 
Colorado Supreme Court in Caldwell, 644 P.2d 26.  The Caldwell decision is 
significant for its recognition of a fraud exception to the attorney-client doctrine as 
an issue that could be raised in a bad-faith claim.  In Caldwell, the plaintiffs were the 
losing parties in a prior automobile personal injury case.  Plaintiffs presented a 
theory that the defendants had conspired to commit fraud in the underlying action, 
resulting in the wrongful entry of summary judgment against plaintiffs.  644 P.2d at 
28.  Plaintiffs sought discovery of information, which would otherwise be privileged, 
to show that the defendants had knowingly concealed or misrepresented material 
information in the underlying case.  Id. at 29-30.  The Caldwell court noted its 
previous recognition of the “future crimes” exception to the attorney-client privilege, 
and agreed that it should extend that exception to cases involving communications 
between attorneys and clients and when the privilege is used by the clients to commit 
current or future fraud.  Id. at 31-32.  The party attempting to show that the 
exception to the privilege applies must show a “foundation of fact for the charge.”  
Id. at 33.  However, the Caldwell court noted that the trial court may review the 
requested documents in camera without having yet made that determination, thus 
relying on the evidence in the review documents themselves to determine whether 
the exception applies.  Id.  The Caldwell court also determined that the attorney need 
not be aware of the client’s fraud for the exception to apply, but the client must show 
that the advice is sought for a wrongful purpose.  Id.  Finally, the Caldwell court 
determined that the work product doctrine is also subject to the crime or fraud 
exception.  Id. at 34. 
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performed should be related to the qualifications of an attorney 
before the privilege will attach.69  Thus, merely hiring an attorney 
does not necessitate the attachment of the attorney-client privilege.  
For example, in Merrin Jewelry Co. v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Insurance 
Co.,70 the insured sought discovery of investigative reports created by 
the insurance company’s attorney.  The court held that to the extent 
the investigation and reports did not necessarily have to be 
conducted by an attorney, using an attorney to conduct such work 
did not “cloak with privilege matters that would otherwise be 
discoverable.”71   
The tripartite relationship between the insurance company, its 
appointed defense counsel, and the insured may trigger the so-called 
“joint client exception” to the attorney-client privilege.72  Under this 
 
 69 See Tayler v. Travelers Ins. Co., 183 F.R.D. 67 (N.D.N.Y. 1998); Evans v. United 
Servs. Auto. Ass’n, 541 S.E.2d 782, 791 (N.C. Ct. App.) (holding that insurance 
company may not avail itself of privilege if attorney was not acting as a legal advisor 
when communication was made), cert. denied, 547 S.E.2d 810 (N.C. 2001); West 
Hampton Adult Home, Inc. v. Nat’l Union Fire Ins. Co., 481 N.Y.S.2d 358, 360 (App. 
Div. 1984) (finding that hiring counsel to conduct policy “examinations under oath” 
and to supervise investigation were activities normally performed in the ordinary 
course of the insurance company’s business and were not unique to the 
qualifications of an attorney). 
 70 49 F.R.D. 54 (S.D.N.Y. 1970). 
 71 Id. at 57; cf. Zullig v. Kan. City Power & Light Co., No. Civ. A. 87-2342, 1989 WL 
7901, at *2 (D. Kan. Jan. 17, 1989) (explaining that “[attorney-client] privilege is 
triggered by the fact that the client is communicating with counsel for the purpose of 
seeking legal advice”).  However, there is consensus among courts and commentators 
that the definition of the “practice of law” is broad.  See, e.g., Fla. Bar v. Brumbaugh, 
355 So. 2d 1186, 1191-92 (Fla. 1978); Alan Morrison, Defining the Unauthorized Practice 
of Law: Some New Ways of Looking at an Old Question, 4 Nova L.J. 363, 364-69 (1980); 
Debra L. Rhode, Policing the Professional Monopoly: A Constitutional and Empirical 
Analysis of Unauthorized Practice Prohibitions, 34 STAN. L. REV. 1 (1981).  Potentially, the 
attorney-client privilege may exist where the advice does not involve licensed 
attorneys.  See generally Larry Alexander, What We Do and Why We Do It, 45 STAN. L. 
REV. 1885, 1898-1900 (1993) (arguing that a juris doctorate is helpful but not 
essential for professors producing “legal scholarship”). 
 72 See, e.g., Henke v. Iowa Home Mut. Cas. Co., 87 N.W.2d 920, 923 (Iowa 1958) 
(holding that communications between insurance company and attorney employed 
by it to defend insured were not privileged because the defense attorney represented 
the insured and the insurance company).  The Iowa Supreme Court limited Henke in 
Squeller Feeds v. Pickering, 530 N.W.2d 678 (Iowa 1995).  In that case, the court ruled 
that Henke only applies to situations when the attorney is acting as attorney for both 
the insured and the insurance company.  Id. at 684; see also Hodges v. S. Farm Bureau 
Cas. Ins. Co., 433 So. 2d 125, 132 (La. 1983) (“[The attorney’s] legal opinions or 
theories concerning [the original suit] benefited not only [the insurance company] 
who seeks to prevent their disclosure but also [the insured], who strives to discover 
them.”).  In Broussard v. State Farm Mutual Auto. Insurance Co., 519 So. 2d 136 (La. 
1988), the Supreme Court of Louisiana stated that “blanket production of the 
attorney’s and insurer’s files is not permitted.”  Id. 
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third exception, an insurance company may not invoke the attorney-
client privilege against its insured concerning communications with 
the attorney hired to represent the insured.73  Courts have 
determined that the duty of loyalty runs to the insured, not the 
insurance company.  Thus, the insurance company cannot invoke the 
privilege and prevent disclosure of confidential communications.74 
C. Waiver of Attorney-Client Privilege 
Express waivers of the attorney-client privilege are easy to 
identify and are therefore not discussed herein.  Whether an implied 
waiver has occurred, however, is a vexing issue.  Courts disagree 
about the general contours of the test to be applied to determine 
whether an implied waiver of the attorney-client privilege has 
occurred.  Courts also dispute at what point a client may be deemed 
to have injected privileged communications with his or her attorney 
into the case, thus causing an implied waiver.  There are three 
general approaches courts have used to determine whether the 
attorney-client privilege has been impliedly waived by a litigant.75 
The first of these general approaches is the “automatic waiver” 
rule, which provides that a litigant automatically waives the 
privilege upon assertion of a claim, counterclaim, or affirmative 
defense that raises as an issue a matter to which otherwise 
privileged material is relevant.  The second set of generalized 
approaches provides that the privilege is waived only when the 
 
The California courts have held that the “joint client exception” does not apply 
to the appointment of Cumis (independent) counsel.  See, e.g., Rockford Int’l Corp. v. 
Superior Court, 26 Cal. App. 4th 1255, 1267 (1994).  California courts have refused 
to extend the “joint client exception” where the insurance company has hired 
counsel to advise it on disputed coverage issues even though the insured argues the 
issues of coverage are “a matter of common interest.”  See, e.g., Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. 
v. Superior Court, 153 Cal. App. 3d 467, 472 (1984); Houston Gen. Ins. Co. v. 
Superior Court, 108 Cal. App. 3d 958, 961 (1980). 
 73 Henke, 87 N.W.2d at 923; Koster v. Junes Trucking, Inc., 625 N.W.2d 82, 84 
(Mich. Ct. App. 2000) (explaining that attorney-client privilege is not recognized 
between liability insurer and its insured because attorney hired to defend the insured 
owed sole loyalty and duty to insured client, not the insurance company); Longo v. 
Am. Policy Holders Ins. Co., 436 A.2d 577, 579-80 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1981) 
(holding that insurance company was precluded from invoking attorney-client 
privilege against its insured to prevent disclosure of confidential communications 
between shared counsel); see also John K. Morris, Conflicts of Interest in Defending Under 
Liability Insurance Policies: A Proposed Solution, 1981 UTAH L. REV. 457, 462 (observing 
that “[a] minority of courts reject the dual representation principle,” while other 
courts are split on who the true client is – the insurance company or the insured). 
 74 Koster, 625 N.W.2d at 84. 
 75 Frontier Ref., Inc. v. Gorman-Rupp Co., 136 F.3d 695, 699-700 (10th Cir. 
1998); Zenith Radio Corp. v. United States, 764 F.2d 1577, 1579 (Fed. Cir. 1985). 
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material to be discovered is both relevant to the issues raised in 
the case and either vital or necessary to the opposing party’s 
defense of the case.  Finally, several courts have recently 
concluded that a litigant waives the attorney-client privilege if, 
and only if, the litigant directly puts the attorney’s advice at issue 
in the litigation.76 
1. Automatic Waiver Rule 
Under the automatic waiver rule, the attorney-client privilege is 
waived upon an assertion of a civil claim or an affirmative defense 
“that raises as an issue a matter to which otherwise privileged material 
is relevant.”77  The automatic waiver rule works well when directed at 
a plaintiff who initiates civil litigation.  As one court has observed, the 
civil plaintiff is a voluntary litigant who “has created the situation 
which requires him to choose between his silence and his lawsuit.”78  
Where the plaintiff has initiated the action and forced a defendant 
into court, the plaintiff cannot use privilege as both a sword and a 
shield.  In Lyons v. Johnson the court observed: 
The scales of justice would hardly remain equal in these respects, 
if a party can assert a claim against another and then be able to 
block all discovery attempts against him by asserting [the attorney-
client] privilege to any interrogation whatsoever upon his claim.  
If any prejudice is to come from such a situation, it must, as a 
matter of basic fairness in the purposes and concepts on which 
the right of litigation rests, be to the party asserting the claim and 
not to the one who has been subjected to its assertion.  It is the 
former who has made the election to create an imbalance in the 
pans of the scales.79 
Defendants ought not be denied a possible defense because 
plaintiffs seek to invoke an alleged privilege.  While this same 
 
 76 Frontier Ref., 136 F.3d at 699-700 (citations omitted). 
 77 Id. at 699; see Indep. Prods. Corp. v. Loew’s, Inc., 22 F.R.D. 266, 276-77 
(S.D.N.Y. 1958) (originating “automatic waiver” rule); see also Lyons v. Johnson, 415 
F.2d 540, 542 (9th Cir. 1969), cert denied, 397 U.S. 1027 (1970) (discussing Independent 
Products and automatic waiver rule); FDIC v. Wise, 139 F.R.D. 168, 170-71 (D. Colo. 
1991) (same). 
 78 Wehling v. Columbia Broad. Sys., 608 F.2d 1084, 1089 n.10 (5th Cir. 1979).  
Typically, a civil plaintiff “voluntarily” brings litigation only because there is no other 
effective means of protecting legal rights.  See Marjorie S. White, Note, Plaintiff as 
Deponent: Invoking the Fifth Amendment, 48 U. CHI. L. REV. 158, 162 (1981) 
(challenging the voluntary-involuntary distinction); Note, Toward a Rational Treatment 
of Plaintiffs Who Invoke the Privilege Against Self-Incrimination During Discovery, 66 IOWA 
L. REV. 575, 594-601 (1981). 
 79 Lyons, 415 F.2d at 542 (discussing specifically the Fifth Amendment privilege 
against self-incrimination). 
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consideration exists where a civil defendant raises an affirmative 
defense that is enmeshed in important evidence that will be 
unavailable to plaintiff if privilege prevails, it is inescapable that the 
defendant was not the principal initiator.  The “automatic waiver” 
rule has been criticized because it minimizes the importance of the 
attorney-client privilege to the adversarial system.80 
2. Intermediate Test Approach 
The intermediate approach balances the need for discovery with 
the importance of maintaining the attorney-client privilege.81  In 
Hearn v. Rhay, 82 the court applied this approach.  The court in Hearn 
analyzed various exceptions to the rules of privilege.83  Principally, the 
court reviewed the physician-patient privilege, which is waived by a 
plaintiff-patient who files a lawsuit placing in controversy the patient’s 
physical condition,84 and the attorney-client privilege, which is 
impliedly waived in litigation between the attorney and client arising 
out of their relationship.85  The court also noted that in patent 
infringement lawsuits, a privilege waiver may occur when the plaintiff 
places the patent’s validity at issue.86  In Hearn, the court found 
persuasive an analogy to cases which have found an implied waiver of 
the attorney-client privilege when a habeas corpus petitioner has 
contested the constitutionality of his conviction in state court.87  In 
the latter situation, other courts have permitted inquiry into the 
attorney-client relationship to determine whether a “deliberate 
bypass” of the right alleged to have been violated occurred.88  A 
 
 80 See Greater Newbury Port Clam Shell Alliance v. Pub. Serv. Co., 838 F.2d 13, 19 
(1st Cir. 1988) (criticizing “automatic waiver” rule); Afro-Lecan, Inc. v. United States, 
820 F.2d 1198, 1205 (Fed. Cir. 1987) (same). 
 81 See Black Panther Party v. Smith, 661 F.2d 1243, 1266-69 (D.C. Cir. 1981) 
(balancing need for discovery with importance of privilege), vacated without opinion, 
Moore v. Black Panther Party, 458 U.S. 1118 (1982). 
 82 68 F.R.D. 574, 581-82 (E.D. Wash. 1975). 
 83 Id. at 580-82. 
 84 Id. at 580. 
 85 Id. 
 86 Id.; see Honeywell, Inc. v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 50 F.R.D. 117, 120 (M.D. Pa. 
1970). 
 87 Hearn, 68 F.R.D. at 581. 
 88 See, e.g., Laughner v. United States, 373 F.2d 326, 327 (5th Cir. 1967); 
Henderson v. Heinz, 349 F.2d 67, 70-71 (9th Cir. 1965). 
A defendant may also waive the privilege by asserting advice of counsel as an 
affirmative defense.  See, e.g., Hunt v. Blackburn, 128 U.S. 464, 470 (1888) (holding 
that allegation that party was mislead by counsel resulted in waiver); Chevron Corp. 
v. Pennzoil Co., 974 F.2d 1156, 1162 (9th Cir. 1992) (holding that privilege was 
waived when party claimed that its tax position was reasonable because it was based 
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common denominator in these situations was that “the party asserting 
the privilege placed information protected by [the attorney-client 
privilege] in issue through some affirmative act for his own benefit, 
and to allow the privilege to protect against disclosure of such 
information would have been manifestly unfair to the opposing 
party.”89  The Hearn court distilled the factors common to recognized 
implied waiver situations: 
(1) assertion of the privilege was a result of some affirmative act, 
such as filing suit, by the asserting party; (2) through this 
affirmative act, the asserting party put the protected information 
at issue by making it relevant to the case; and (3) application of 
the privilege would have denied the opposing party access to 
information vital to his defense. 90 
The Hearn court further instructed that when these three conditions 
are present, “a court should find that the party asserting a privilege 
has impliedly waived it through his own affirmative conduct.”91  
Significantly, the third prong of the Hearn test places the burden on 
the party seeking discovery to show that the information is relevant 
and material to the claim or defense.92  One court has held that 
disclosure of information vital to a party’s case should be compelled 
“only after the litigant has shown that he has exhausted every 
reasonable alternative source of information.”93  Furthermore, the 
party “must describe the information they hope to obtain and its 
importance to their case with a reasonable degree of specificity.”94 
A court should begin this analysis with a presumption in favor of 
 
on advice of counsel). 
 89 Hearn, 68 F.R.D. at 581. 
 90 Id.; see also Home Indem. Co. v. Lane Powell Moss & Miller, 43 F.3d 1322, 1326 
(9th Cir. 1995) (interpreting Alaska law). 
 91 Hearn, 68 F.R.D. at 581. 
 92 Id. at 582.  The burden is proportionate to the danger posed by the discovery 
to the type of privilege being asserted.  Where a constitutional privilege is involved, 
for example, the First Amendment associational privilege, a heavy burden for 
disclosure exists primarily because of the “preferred position of First Amendment 
rights” in civil cases.  Black Panther Party, 661 F.2d at 1268; see also Zenith Radio Corp. 
v. United States, 764 F.2d 1577 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (rejecting the automatic waiver rule 
to protect non-constitutional privileges).  The Sixth Amendment provides a shield 
for the attorney-client privilege only in criminal proceedings.  Upon the termination 
of these proceedings and initiation of a civil action putting the privilege at issue, that 
constitutional protection ends.  The liberal federal policy favoring discovery is of 
substantially greater relative weight where the party invokes the privilege in a civil 
rather than a criminal case.  Indep. Prods. Corp. v. Loew’s, Inc., 22 F.R.D. 266, 278-
79 (S.D.N.Y. 1958). 
 93 Black Panther Party, 661 F.2d at 1268. 
 94 Id. 
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preserving the privilege.  However, under the Hearn test, in civil 
actions, fairness may require that the privilege holder surrender the 
privilege in so far as it will weaken, in a meaningful way, the opposing 
party’s ability to defend.  The privilege will give way where a party 
seeking to pierce the privilege can establish that the claim, and 
probable defenses thereto, are enmeshed in important, vital evidence 
that will be otherwise unavailable if the privilege prevails. 
The Hearn test is followed by the majority of jurisdictions,95 but 
the test is not without its critics.  A significant minority of courts 
criticize the Hearn analysis because it focuses excessively on the 
asserted relevancy of the privileged communications while ignoring 
the reason why the privilege is recognized in the first place.96  An 
example of this criticism is found in Rhone-Poulenc Rorer, Inc. v. Home 
Indemnity Co.97  The court in Rhone-Poulenc observed that while the 
Hearn court “dress[ed] up [its] analysis with a checklist of factors, [it] 
appear[s] to rest on a conclusion that the information sought is 
relevant and should in fairness be disclosed.”98  Focusing on the 
important justifications behind the attorney-client privilege, the 
Rhone-Poulenc court expressed the criticism that the relationship 
between a client and his or her attorney will suffer because of the 
uncertainty regarding whether communications will remain 
confidential. 
Clients will face the greatest risk of disclosure for what may be the 
most important matters.  Furthermore, because the definition of 
what may be relevant and discoverable from those consultations 
 
 95 See, e.g., Frontier Ref., 136 F.3d at 699-700, 701; Lane Powell Moss & Miller, 43 
F.3d at 1326; see also Pyramid Controls, Inc. v. Siemens Indus. Automations, Inc., 176 
F.R.D. 269, 272 (N.D. Ill. 1997) (describing Hearn as “the seminal case on ‘at issue’ 
waiver”); Timothy P. Glynn, Federalizing Privilege, 52 AM. U. L. REV. 59, 118-19 & n.260 
(2002) (noting that a majority of jurisdictions follow a Hearn-like approach). 
 96 See Harter v. Univ. of Indianapolis, 5 F. Supp. 2d 657, 664-65 & n.2 (S.D. Ind. 
1998) (stating that “better-reasoned cases” hold that the act of filing a lawsuit where 
state of mind may be relevant does not waive privilege unless client specifically relies 
on advice of counsel; contrary rule “effectively discourages a client from seeking legal 
advice by removing the assurance of confidentiality”); Transamerica Title Ins. Co. v. 
Superior Court, 233 Cal. Rptr. 825, 828-29 (Ct. App. 1987) (stating that “[p]rivileged 
communications do not become discoverable simply because they are related to 
issues in the litigation” and upholding privilege even though insurer’s general state 
of mind was at issue in bad-faith claim where insurer stipulated that it would not rely 
on advice-of-counsel defense).  Other courts are more protective of the privilege and 
will not find waiver unless the client directly relies on advice of counsel.  See, e.g., 
Aranson v. Schroder, 671 A.2d 1023, 1030 (N.H. 1995) (holding that there is no 
waiver unless “the privilege holder injects the privileged material itself into the 
case”). 
 97 32 F.3d 851, 863 (3d Cir. 1994) (criticizing Hearn as of dubious validity). 
 98 Id. at 864. 
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may depend on the facts and circumstances of as yet unfiled 
litigation, the client will have no sense of whether the 
communication may be relevant to some future issue, and will 
have no sense of certainty or assurance that the communication 
will remain confidential. 99 
The court in Rhone-Poulenc found that the advice of counsel was 
not placed in issue merely because it was relevant and that the advice 
given did not necessarily become an issue merely because the 
attorney’s advice might affect the client’s state of mind in a relevant 
matter.100  The advice of counsel is placed in issue where the client 
asserts a claim or defense, and attempts to prove that claim or 
defense by disclosing or describing an attorney-client 
communication.101 
3. Restrictive Test 
Under this approach, a litigant waives the attorney-client 
privilege if, and only if, the litigant directly puts the attorney’s advice 
at issue in the litigation.102  For example, when a client files a 
malpractice action against his attorney, he or she may waive the 
privilege as to particular communications.103  By placing the attorney’s 
advice at issue, the client is waiving the privilege by requiring an 
examination of the facts and issues relating to that advice.104 
D. Waiver Through Direct Assertion of the Advice-of-Counsel Defense 
An insurance company may defend itself against allegations of 
bad faith and malicious claim handling by providing evidence that it 
relied upon the advice of competent counsel.105  The so-called advice-
 
 99 Id. 
 100 Id. at 863. 
 101 Id.; see also Pittston Co. v. Allianz Ins. Co., 143 F.R.D. 66, 71 (D.N.J. 1992); N. 
River Ins. Co. v. Phila. Reins. Corp., 797 F. Supp. 363, 370 (D.N.J. 1992). 
 102 Rhone-Poulenc, 32 F.3d at 863-64 (adopting restrictive test and criticizing more 
liberal views of waiver; purpose of privilege still applies when “state of mind” is at 
issue and single-minded focus on relevance “completely undermines the interest to 
be served”; no waiver where plaintiffs had not “injected the advice of counsel as an 
essential element of a claim”); see also Public Serv. Co. of N.M. v. Lyons, 10 P.3d 166, 
173 (N.M. Ct. App. 2000) (rejecting the Hearn approach and adopting the Rhone-
Poulenc test that there must be “an offensive or direct use of privileged information” 
before the attorney-client privilege will be deemed to have been waived). 
 103 Rhone-Poulenc, 32 F.3d at 863. 
 104 Id. at 865. 
 105 State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Superior Court, 279 Cal. Rptr. 116, 117-18 
(Ct. App. 1991).  Reliance on advice of counsel has also allowed insurers to avoid 
punitive damages for bad-faith conduct.  See, e.g., Gorman v. Southeastern Fid. Ins. 
Co., 775 F.2d 655, 659-60 (5th Cir. 1985) (interpreting Mississippi law); see also 
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of-counsel106 defense107 provides that when an insurer’s actions are in 
conformity with advice given by its counsel, the insurer’s actions are 
made in good faith.  Thus, state of mind, an essential element that an 
aggrieved policyholder must demonstrate in establishing insurer bad 
faith, is nullified.108  Conversely, the rejection of counsel’s advice109 or 
the failure to seek legal advice when prudent claim handling dictates 
 
Melorich Builders, Inc. v. Superior Court, 207 Cal. Rptr. 47, 50 (Ct. App. 1984) 
(holding that good faith reliance on advice of counsel is a “complete defense” to a 
punitive damage claim). 
 106 For competing views on the scope of advice of counsel and its appropriateness, 
compare James M. Fischer, Should Advice of Counsel Constitute a Defense for Insurer Bad 
Faith?, 72 TEX. L. REV. 1447 (1994), with Michael Sean Quinn, The Advice-of-Counsel 
Defense: A Response to Fischer, 72 TEX. L. REV. 1487 (1994).  See generally Nielsen, supra 
note 15, at 542-44. 
 107 The term “defense” is a misnomer.  The advice of counsel is typically accepted 
as only some evidence that, if believed, may tend to negate the claim that an 
insurance company engaged in bad faith.  Advice of counsel is less frequently 
accepted as an absolute defense to a claim of bad faith.  See Annotation, Reliance on, 
or Rejection of, Advice of Counsel as Factor Affecting Liability in Action Against Liability 
Insurer for Wrongful Refusal to Settle Claim, 63 A.L.R.3d 725, 730 (1975); cf. Crowe v. 
Lucas, 595 F.2d 985, 992 (5th Cir. 1979) (“Reliance on advice of counsel does not 
serve as an absolute defense to a civil rights action.  Rather, it is among the calculus 
of facts that a jury is to consider on the issue of good faith.”). 
 108 Guy O. Kornblum, The Current State of Bad Faith and Punitive Damages in the 
United States, 23 TORT & INS. L.J. 812, 838-39 (1988).  Many courts have articulated a 
“fairly debatable” standard for insurer bad faith.  See, e.g., Davis v. Cotton States Mut. 
Ins. Co., 604 So. 2d 354, 358 (Ala. 1992); Deese v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 838 
P.2d 1265, 1268 (Ariz. 1992); Garnett v. Transamerica Ins. Servs., 800 P.2d 656, 666 
(Idaho 1990); Nassen v. Nat’l States Ins. Co., 494 N.W.2d 231, 236 (Iowa 1992), cert. 
denied, 503 U.S. 1031 (1993); Pickett v. Lloyds of London, 621 A.2d 445, 453 (N.J. 
1993); Tokles & Sons, Inc. v. Midwestern Indem. Co., 605 N.E.2d 936, 943 (Ohio 
1992); Bartlett v. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co., 538 A.2d 997, 1000 (R.I. 1988); In 
re Certification of a Question of Law from the U.S. Dist. Court of S.D., W. Div. 
(Champion v. U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co.), 399 N.W.2d 320, 324 (S.D. 1987); Newhouse v. 
Citizens Sec. Mut. Ins. Co., 501 N.W.2d 1, 5-6 (Wis. 1993); First Wyo. Bank, N.A. v. 
Cont’l Ins. Co., 860 P.2d 1094, 1101 (Wyo. 1993).  For a different permutation of the 
“fairly debatable” standard, see Hans Construction Co. v. Phoenix Assurance Co., 995 
F.2d 53 (5th Cir. 1993), where the court, applying Mississippi law, held that the 
retention and use of an independent expert gave the insurance company “arguable 
reasons” for denying a claim.  Conflicting opinions of the insurer’s counsel and the 
policyholder’s counsel, after each has reviewed the facts and law, may legitimize the 
presence of a fairly debatable dispute. 
 109 See, e.g., Md. Cas. Co. v. Elmira Coal Co., 69 F.2d 616, 620 (8th Cir. 1934); Am. 
Mut. Liab. Ins. Co. v. Cooper, 61 F.2d 446, 448 (5th Cir. 1932), cert. denied, 289 U.S. 
736 (1933); Kinder v. W. Pioneer Ins. Co., 42 Cal. Rptr. 394, 398-99 (Ct. App. 1965); 
Thompson v. Commercial Union Ins. Co. of N.Y., 250 So. 2d 259, 260 (Fla. 1971); 
Cotton States Mut. Ins. Co. v. Trevethan, 390 So. 2d 724, 728 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.), 
appeal denied, 392 So. 2d 1373 (Fla. 1980). 
For a cynical discussion of insurer’s reliance on advice of counsel, see Lozier v. Auto 
Owner’s Insurance Co., 951 F.2d 251, 255-56 (9th Cir. 1991) (interpreting Arizona 
law). 
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doing so may be evidence of bad faith.110 
Jurisdictions are split over the acceptance of the advice-of-
counsel defense.111  Whether the advice-of-counsel defense is available 
may depend upon a particular jurisdiction’s legal standard regarding 
the tort of bad faith.  A definitive standard of bad faith is difficult to 
formulate because the elements of the test change as the context 
changes.112  Where the insurer’s state of mind is the focus of the bad-
faith claim of unreasonableness, the advice-of-counsel defense may be 
applicable.113  In those jurisdictions where the tort requires proof of 
 
 110 See H. Walter Croskey, Bad Faith in California: Its History, Development and Current 
Status, 26 TORT & INS. L.J. 561, 579 (1991) (opining that insurers may be under duty 
to consult with counsel at least in matters involving the reasonableness of settlement 
demands).  An interesting case is Allen v. Allstate Insurance Co., 656 F.2d 487, 489-90 
(9th Cir. 1981), holding that, under California law, a jury could find that the 
insurance company acted in bad faith when it relied on the litigation estimate 
provided by counsel rather than on the litigation estimate prepared by the district 
manager.  The court characterized the attorney’s opinion as “wishful.”  Id. at 489. 
 111 STEPHAN S. ASHLEY, BAD FAITH ACTIONS § 7:13 (1984 & Supp. 1993) (reporting 
an almost even split between those jurisdictions that recognize the defense and those 
that reject it). 
 112 See Nielsen, supra note 15.  Commentators have offered varying views of how 
many standards of bad faith exist.  For an analysis of how commentators have offered 
various opinions on the standard to determine bad faith, see Boyarski, supra note 15. 
 113 The link between the advice-of-counsel defense and the insurance company’s 
state of mind can be seen in non-insurance cases.  As an example, in Ortho 
Pharmaceutical Corp. v. Smith, 959 F.2d 936 (Fed. Cir. 1992), the advice of counsel was 
advanced in a patent infringement case to negate the element of willfulness.  The 
court noted that “counsel’s opinion must be thorough enough . . . to instill a belief 
in the infringer that the court might reasonably hold the patent is invalid, not 
infringed, or unenforceable.”  Id. at 944.  In Read Corp. v. Portec, Inc., 970 F.2d 816 
(Fed. Cir. 1992), the court noted that the advice-of-counsel defense does not lie 
when the legal advice is not sufficient to instill in the client a basis for reasonable 
belief in the accuracy and soundness of the advice.  The court explained: 
This . . . does not mean a client must itself be able to evaluate the legal 
competency of its attorney’s advice to avoid a finding of willfulness.  
The client would not need the attorney’s advice at all in that event.  
That an opinion is “incompetent” must be shown by objective evidence.  
For example, an attorney may not have looked into the necessary facts, 
and, thus, there would be no foundation for his opinion.  A written 
opinion may be incompetent on its face by reason of its containing 
merely conclusory statements without discussion of facts or obviously 
presenting only a superficial or off-the-cuff analysis. 
Id. at 829.  The court also noted: 
An opinion of counsel, of course, need not unequivocally state that the 
client will not be held liable for infringement.  An honest opinion is 
more likely to speak of probabilities than certainties.  A good test that 
the advice given is genuine and not merely self-serving is whether the 
asserted defenses are backed up with viable proof during trial which 
raises substantial questions. 
Id. n.9. 
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the insurance company’s actual intent to harm, the advice-of-counsel 
defense may undermine and diminish the required mental state 
necessary to establish bad faith.  It must be established that the 
company knew or should have known that its conduct created an 
unreasonable risk of harm to the insured.114  Where the alleged bad 
faith is based on the insurance company’s conduct, the advice of 
counsel may become irrelevant because the insurance company’s 
conduct should be evaluated against industry standards for claims 
handling and claims processing.115 
Commentators have different views regarding the necessary 
elements that give rise to the advice-of-counsel defense.  One 
commentator116 has delineated four necessary elements of the 
defense: “(1) the insurer sought counsel’s advice in good faith; (2) 
the insurer disclosed all pertinent information to its attorney; (3) the 
insurer acted on the advice in good faith; and (4) the attorney was 
competent in the particular area of law and disinterested in the 
matter.”117 
Although these proposed elements may be jointly sufficient to 
establish the absence of bad faith, other commentators postulate that 
fewer elements are necessary: 
For example, it is not necessary that the insurer seek counsel’s 
advice in good faith.  The insurer might seek counsel’s advice in 
bad faith and come into a state of good faith by having been 
jolted by counsel’s vivid, perceptive, and well-reasoned opinion 
letter.  It also is not necessary that the insurer disclose all 
pertinent information to its attorney.  The insurer may not have 
all of the pertinent information, and might commission the 
lawyer to complete the investigation.  Moreover, if the opinion 
letter came to the correct conclusion, even though missing 
pertinent information, if the insurer acted on the letter 
appropriately, and if the failure to disclose all of the pertinent 
information was nothing more than negligent, the opinion letter 
 
 114 See, e.g., Webb v. Int’l Indem. Co., 599 So. 2d 1144, 1146 (Ala. 1992); see also 
Walbrook Ins. Co. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 7 Cal. Rptr. 2d 513, 517-18 (Ct. App. 
1992) (explaining that establishing good faith involves an inquiry into motive, intent, 
and state of mind). 
 115 See Travelers Ins. Co. v. Savio, 706 P.2d 1258, 1275 (Colo. 1985) (“Whether an 
insurer has acted reasonably in denying or delaying approval of a claim will be 
determined on an objective basis, requiring proof of the standards of conduct in the 
industry.”).  But see Silberg v. Cal. Life Ins. Co., 521 P.2d 1103, 1109 (Cal. 1974) 
(“The scope of the duty of an insurer to deal fairly with its insured is prescribed by 
law and cannot be delineated entirely by customs of the insurance industry.”). 
 116 Nielsen, supra note 15. 
 117 Id. at 543 (emphasis omitted). 
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should still immunize the insurer from bad faith.118 
Professor Quinn has identified criteria associated with the hiring 
of counsel to analyze coverage questions:119 (1) reasonable judgment 
must be exercised by the insurer in selecting experienced and 
competent coverage counsel; (2) sufficient facts and information 
must be provided for coverage counsel to render an appropriate 
opinion; (3) coverage counsel reasonably appears to have researched, 
investigated, and analyzed the issues; (4) coverage counsel 
communicates the opinion in a reasonable way; that is, coverage 
counsel’s analysis shows that objective consideration has been given 
to the facts and issues, any alternatives, the law, how to present 
arguments, and so forth; (5) the insurer thoughtfully considered the 
coverage opinion; and (6) the insurer largely follows the advice of 
counsel.120  Furthermore, reliance on the advice of counsel must be 
 
 118 Michael Sean Quinn & Kimberly Steele, Insurance Coverage Opinions, 36 S. TEX. 
L. REV. 479, 494-95 (1995).  However, courts may take a contrary view.  In Bertero v. 
National General Corp., 529 P.2d 608 (Cal. 1974), the court observed: 
[I]f the initiator acts in bad faith or withholds from counsel facts he 
knew or should have known would defeat a cause of action otherwise 
appearing from the information supplied, that [reliance on legal 
advice] defense fails.  Similarly, counsel’s advice must be sought in 
good faith and “. . . not as a mere cloak to protect one against a suit for 
malicious prosecution.” 
Id. at 616 (citations omitted) (quoting Walker v. Jensen, 212 P.2d 569, 572 (Cal. Ct. 
App. 1949)); see Read Corp., 970 F.2d at 829 & n.9. 
 119 Quinn, supra note 106. 
 120 Id. at 1489.  The method by which the advice of coverage counsel is 
communicated to the insurance company is through a so-called coverage opinion 
letter.  The components of this type of correspondence were discussed by Professors 
Quinn and Steele: 
Generally, insurance coverage opinions recite the issues; recount 
and analyze the facts, if they are undisputed; make factual assumptions, 
if the insurance company wants to know the law applicable to one or 
more stipulated sets of facts; explore factual conflicts, if the facts are 
disputed; set forth the applicable provisions of the insurance contract 
verbatim; if necessary, interpret the language of the insurance contract 
in light of the law; analyze the facts, or assumed or conflicting factual 
scenarios, in the light of the contract as interpreted; provide reasoned 
answers to the issues posed; and report any important deadlines. . . . 
[T]here are two interconnected and overriding issues: Does the 
insured have a right to be paid or to be provided with some service?  
And, if so, how much or of what kind of service?. . . . The format of 
opinions is fairly uniform.  After reciting the opening pleasantries, they 
set forth undisputed, assumed, or disputed version of the facts, as 
appropriate; the applicable language of the contract; the law governing 
the analysis of the contract; the analysis of the contract; the law 
governing the domain of relevant facts; the legal rules governing how 
to apply the contract to the facts; answers to the various issues; and 
vindications of those answers.  If there are qualifications or caveats, 
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reasonable.121  This requires, in part, that the insurance company 
provide counsel with sufficient factual and other available, relevant 
information necessary to offer an accurate opinion or advice.122  
Where an insurance company knows or has reason to know that the 
advice of its counsel is incorrect, it will not be able to avoid bad-faith 
liability exposure by claiming reliance.123  Finally, the advice must be 
 
these are frequently stated, or repeated, at the end of the letter. . . . 
Often, if the insurer needs to send some sort of letter to the insured, a 
proposed draft will accompany the opinion letter.  This might be an 
unqualified affirmation of coverage, sometimes called an unqualified 
acceptance of the claim; it might be a reservation of rights letter, by 
which the insurer agrees to provide money or services, or to perform 
additional investigations, without committing itself further; or it might 
be a letter declining coverage, or as it is called in some property 
insurance circles, a letter rejecting the claim. 
Quinn & Steele, supra note 118, at 480-82 (paragraph structure omitted).  Coverage 
opinions “are epistolary, single-spaced, and long.”  Id. at 484. 
 121 See, e.g., Burns v. Okla. Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co., 11 P.3d 162 (Okla. 2000) 
(acknowledging that reliance on advice of counsel can be a defense provided that 
reliance was reasonable, and, because advice of counsel was against existing case law 
and statutes, holding that reliance was unreasonable). 
 122 See, e.g., Ins. Co. of N. Am. v. Smith, 375 S.E.2d 866, 868-70 (Ga. Ct. App. 1988) 
(holding that where insurance company does not provide its counsel with all facts or 
information necessary to offer an accurate opinion or advice, it cannot invoke the 
defense); see also Bertero, 529 P.2d at 616-17. 
 123 See Allan v. Allstate Ins. Co., 656 F.2d 487, 489-90 (9th Cir. 1981) (holding that 
insurer’s reliance on obviously poor strategic advice of defense counsel did not 
shield it from bad-faith claim).  The case law has not addressed the probabilistic 
relationship regarding the advice provided by counsel and a particular justification 
for denying coverage.  One commentator has discussed this dilemma: 
[I]t is not likely that there will ever be helpful law on this point.  It is 
fairly obvious, in this context, that if a lawyer advises an insurance 
company that a given argument on behalf of no coverage should 
succeed before a court in a perfectly rational world, and if there is a 
sixty percent chance that it will succeed in our world, then this should 
constitute enough probability to defeat any suggestion of bad faith.  
But there are complications.  How the law treats assessments of 
probability may depend upon whether the uncertainty derives from 
fact, or whether it derives from law.  Obviously, in an unsettled area of 
the law, low probabilities as to the legal aspects of the opinion do not 
necessarily mean that there is no reasonable basis for the carrier’s 
action.  Further, the factual aspects of the opinion may be complicated.  
An insurance carrier is expected to know what happened with a high 
degree of certainty in the absence of conflicting factual scenarios.  
Obviously, if there are materially conflicting factual scenarios, 
probability assessments are extremely difficult.  Material and credible 
factual disputes may, in and of themselves, constitute a reasonable basis 
for denying the claim.  The upshot of this discussion is that there is no 
obvious connection between the probability that an opinion is right, 
and whether the insurance carrier has a reasonable basis for denying a 
claim.  There is some relationship, to be sure, but the relationship is 
complex. 
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timely.  An insurance company cannot bootstrap an incorrect 
coverage decision by later consulting with counsel. 124 
The nature of the communication must be examined.  Where 
the attorney is hired to perform claims adjusting or to act in a 
capacity other than as a lawyer, the communications may not be 
privileged.125  Some courts look to the “dominant purpose” of the 
communication to determine whether the attorney-client privilege 
exists for communications between the insurance company and the 
attorney.126  The dominant purpose of the transaction must be to 
transmit information in the course of the attorney’s professional 
employment.127  “The relevant question is not whether [the attorney] 
was retained to conduct an investigation, but rather, whether this 
investigation was related to the rendition of legal services.”128  
Therefore, the parties must intend the communication to be 
confidential.129 
The scope of the waiver that occurs when the advice-of-counsel 
 
Quinn & Steele, supra note 118, at 497-98; see also Clemco Indus. v. Commercial 
Union Ins. Co., 665 F. Supp. 816, 827-28 (N.D. Cal. 1987) (holding that the 
insurance carrier had not acted in bad faith when it incorrectly relied upon the 
definition of “occurrence” which was used to form a manifestation trigger theory in 
the 1970s and 1980s but was currently outdated); Hartford Accident & Indem. Co. v. 
Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 792 P.2d 749 (Ariz. 1990) (reversing prior precedent and 
finding that insurance company should have anticipated a change in the law). 
 124 See, e.g., Employers Mut. Cas. Co. v. Thompkins, 490  So. 2d 897, 900-05 (Miss. 
1986); see also Beacon Nat’l Ins. Co. v. Reynolds, 799 S.W.2d 390 (Tex. App. 1990).  
In Beacon, the insurance company wrongfully denied a claim which resulted in a state 
board of insurance complaint.  Months after denying the claim, and only in response 
to the board’s demand, did the insurance company seek counsel.  Id. at 397.  The 
insurance company attempted to introduce its counsel’s letter at trial as proof of its 
reasonable claim denial.  Id.  The trial court refused to permit the letter’s 
introduction.  The court in Beacon concluded that the insurance company could not 
have relied on its counsel’s advice in good faith given the timing of the letter.  Id. 
 125 Mission Nat’l Ins. Co. v. Lilly, 112 F.R.D. 160, 163 (D. Minn. 1986) (holding 
that the ordinary business of a party is outside the scope of attorney-client privilege); 
Hercules, Inc. v. Exxon Corp., 434 F. Supp. 136, 147 (D. Del. 1977) (stating that 
advice of counsel rendered on non-legal matters is not within scope of attorney-client 
privilege); Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Superior Court, 200 Cal. Rptr. 471, 476 (Ct. App. 
1984). 
 126 See, e.g., Travelers Ins. Co. v. Superior Court, 191 Cal. Rptr. 871 (Ct. App. 
1983). 
 127 Id. at 879.  In Lanasa v. State, 71 A. 1058, 1064 (Md. 1909), the test utilized for 
“legal advice” was whether the communications relate to professional advice and to 
the subject matter about which such advice is sought. 
 128 In re Allen, 106 F.3d 582, 603 (4th Cir. 1997) (internal quotation marks 
omitted) (holding that a determination of whether the investigation is privileged will 
focus on whether the issues are routine or whether they are complex issues of law, 
which intrinsically require sophisticated legal appraisals). 
 129 See In re Underwriters at Lloyds, 666 F.2d 55, 57 (4th Cir. 1981). 
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defense is raised is unclear.130  Once the insurance company 
interposes the advice-of-counsel defense regarding a particular claim, 
the correspondence between the attorney and the insurance 
company is placed at issue and becomes discoverable.131  A relevant 
query at this juncture becomes whether reliance on the advice of 
counsel acts as an implied waiver of other coverage opinions 
prepared for the same insurance company by the same attorney (or 
the same law firm).132  Waiver of the attorney-client privilege for one 
communication may in some instances permanently waive the 
privilege for all related communications.133 
E. Recent Expansion of Implied Waiver 
Recently, the supreme courts of Delaware, Arizona, and Ohio 
 
 130 See Conkling v. Turner, 883 F.2d 431, 434-35 (5th Cir. 1989); Bowne of N.Y.C., 
Inc. v. Am. Base Corp., 150 F.R.D. 465, 487-89 (S.D.N.Y. 1993); SEC v. Forma, 117 
F.R.D. 516, 523 (S.D.N.Y. 1987); Bd. of Trs. v. Coulter Corp., 118 F.R.D. 532, 533 
(S.D. Fla. 1987); Russell v. Curtin Matheson Scientific, Inc., 493 F. Supp. 456, 458 
(S.D. Tex. 1980); Pitney-Bowes v. Mestre, 86 F.R.D. 444, 446-47 (S.D. Fla. 1980); 
Handgards, Inc. v. Johnson & Johnson, 413 F. Supp. 926, 929 (N.D. Cal. 1976); 
Garfinkle v. Arcata Nat’l Corp., 64 F.R.D. 688, 689-90 (S.D.N.Y. 1974); Republic Ins. 
Co. v. Davis, 856 S.W.2d 158, 163 (Tex. 1993). 
 131 See, e.g., Ellison v. Gray, 702 P.2d 360, 363 (Okla. 1985). 
 132 One commentator has discussed this slippery slope: 
Insurers frequently limit the number of firms they engage to provide 
coverage opinions for good reasons.  One of them is economic.  
Another is that insurance coverage is a niche practice, where reservoirs 
of learning and practical experience are extremely valuable.  In legal 
situations where there are recurrent themes and problems, forms are 
used.  Many coverage attorneys who have a large number of duty-to-
defend coverage opinions to deliver, develop a standardized discourse 
upon the [state] law of the duty-to-defend.  This befits a form, and 
routinely appears in formal opinion letters. 
If the waiver of the attorney-client privilege for a coverage opinion 
might lead to the implied waiver of that privilege for other letters, this 
matter must be carefully considered.  The route from the letter 
produced, to the letters not produced is quite simple.  The 
policyholder might take the deposition of the lawyer who wrote the 
coverage opinion and ask him which sections of the letter were canned.  
If the lawyer identifies several, and is then induced to go on and say 
that he frequently relies upon forms, the policyholder might have the 
right to discover redacted versions of other letters on somewhat the 
same topic. 
Quinn & Steele, supra note 118, at 496. 
 133 See, e.g., Duplin Corp. v. Deering Milliken, Inc., 397 F. Supp. 1146, 1161-62 
(D.S.C. 1974).  But see Commonwealth v. Goldman, 480 N.E.2d 1023, 1027 (Mass. 
1985) (holding that waiver will only apply to communications relating to same 
object); Transamerica Title Ins. Co. v. Superior Court, 233 Cal. Rptr. 825, 828 (Ct. 
App. 1987) (holding that disclosure of limited number of attorney-client privilege 
materials will not entitle opposing party to the materials relating to advice given). 
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have rendered significant decisions regarding implied waiver in the 
insurance bad-faith context.  Although each of these courts utilizes 
previously recognized analytic approaches to the implied waiver 
question, the courts set a minimal threshold for waiver that is the 
functional equivalent of a per se waiver rule.  When an implied waiver 
question arises, courts must objectively determine when the 
privileged party’s conduct reaches a certain point of disclosure, such 
that fairness requires that the privilege be waived irrespective of 
whether the privileged person intended such waiver.  In Delaware, 
the threshold for waiver involved the insurance company’s statement 
that it had engaged in “routine [claim] handling.”  The Delaware 
court examined in camera the insurance company’s claim file, and, on 
its own initiative, found sufficient facts to conclude that waiver was 
required.  In Arizona, the “certain point” is reached when the 
insurance company “claims its conduct was proper and permitted by 
law and based in whole or in part on its evaluation of the state of the 
law.”  This situation exists in almost all insurance bad-faith cases.  In 
Ohio, as in Delaware, the court examined in camera the insurance 
company’s claim file.  If the court finds in its review any attorney-
client privileged communications that show a lack of good faith, 
those communications are “wholly unworthy of the protections 
afforded by any claimed privilege.”  In Ohio, the mere filing of a bad-
faith case entitles a court to an in camera review of the insurance 
company’s attorney-client privileged communications.  Collectively, 
the Delaware, Arizona, and Ohio precedents may represent a trend in 
the law regarding implied waiver that will have a chilling effect upon 
attorney-client communications in the insurance context.  The 
Delaware, Arizona, and Ohio precedents are discussed below. 
1. Tackett v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Insurance Co. 
(Delaware) 
In Tackett v. State Farm,134 an insured sued State Farm for bad 
faith, claiming that the insurance company had wrongfully attempted 
to underpay, and then delayed payment of, an underinsured motorist 
claim following a company “get tough” policy.135  The “get tough” 
policy was established to limit an expected increase in bodily injury 
claims.136  State Farm took the position that it had “reasonable 
justification” for underpayment and delay.137  When pressed for an 
 
 134 Tackett v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Ins. Co., 653 A.2d 254 (Del. 1995). 
 135 Id. at 256-57. 
 136 Id. 
 137 Id. at 258. 
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explanation of this “reasonable justification,” State Farm responded 
by stating in an answer to an interrogatory, that the claims-handling 
process “show[ed] a reasonable and orderly pattern of claims 
handling which ultimately and in due course led to the payment of 
the policy coverage.”138  The insured then sought discovery of the 
basis of State Farm’s position.139  State Farm withheld certain 
documents, claiming that both attorney-client privilege and the work 
product doctrine applied.140  After an in camera examination of the 
pertinent documents, the trial court ordered their disclosure.141  The 
Delaware Supreme Court affirmed.  In doing so, the supreme court 
noted that “waiver of the attorney client privilege may be implicit, 
even if contrary to the party’s actual intent.”142  The court explained 
that considerations of fairness and consistency are perforce included 
in determining waiver: 
A privileged person would seldom be found to waive, if his 
intention not to abandon could alone control the situation.  
There is always also the objective consideration that when his 
conduct touches a certain point of disclosure, fairness requires 
that his immunity shall cease whether he intended the result or 
not.143 
After acknowledging that in the context of the attorney-client 
privilege, waiver rests on the rationale of fairness (that is, disclosure 
of otherwise privileged information by the client under circumstances 
where “it would be unfair to deny the other party an opportunity to 
discover other relevant facts with respect to that subject matter”144), 
the court noted that a party cannot compel an insurance company to 
surrender the protections of the attorney-client privilege simply by 
bringing a bad-faith lawsuit.145  “Where, however, an insurer makes 
factual assertions in defense of a claim which incorporate, expressly or 
implicitly, the advice and judgment of its counsel, it cannot deny an 
opposing party ‘an opportunity to uncover the foundation for those 
 
 138 Id. (emphasis omitted). 
 139 Id. at 257. 
 140 Tackett, 653 A.2d at 257. 
 141 Id. 
 142 Id. at 259. 
 143 Id. (quoting 8 JOHN H. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 2327 
(J. McNaughton rev. ed. 1961)). 
 144 Id. (quoting Hercules, Inc. v. Exxon Corp., 343 F. Supp. 136, 156 (D. Del. 
1977)). 
 145 Id. (citing generally Hoescht Celanese Corp. v. Nat’l Union Fire Ins. Co. of 
Pittsburgh, 623 A.2d 1118, 1125 (Del. Super. Ct. 1992)). 
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assertions in order to contradict them.’”146 
The court in Tackett concluded that the insured had met the 
exacting standards for a finding of implied waiver of the attorney-
client privilege.147  In its answer, State Farm contended that it did not 
unreasonably deny the insured’s claim, and raised the affirmative 
defense of failure of the insured to provide information necessary for 
the insurer to process the claim.148  Although this defense did not 
directly relate to any protected communications, the court observed 
that it did “suggest that there was nothing in the routine handling of 
the claim that contributed to the delay.”149  When State Farm was 
required to set forth the reasons to support its claim of reasonable 
justification for non-payment, it relied upon the affidavit of one of its 
claims superintendents who was responsible for handling the Tackett 
claim.150  The affidavit cited in relevant part the following: 
Based on my experience of ten years, this claim was handled 
routinely, without any undue delay, with no bad faith on the part 
of State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company or its 
employees.  Furthermore, no reason existed to handle this claim 
unlike any other claim that comes through this office, and based 
on my experience, State Farm handled this claim as expediently 
as any other claims office in this local [sic] would have handled a 
similar claim.151 
Reviewing these facts the court in Tackett observed: 
Once State Farm alleged particularized facts that implicitly relied 
upon communications with counsel contained in the Tacketts’ 
file, the first prong of the waiver analysis was satisfied—disclosure 
of otherwise protected facts relevant to a particular subject matter 
relied upon as a defense. 
  . . . Here, once State Farm alleged a routine handling of the 
Tacketts’ claim and suggested that any delay was attributable to 
inaction on the part of the insured, the Tacketts could challenge 
those allegations only with a full showing of the facts contained in 
the claim file.  To rule otherwise would permit State Farm to gain 
the inference that, not only was the claim handled routinely, but 
the routine analysis of the claim supported the delay in payment.  
Fairness requires that assertions of fact be tested by disclosure.  
 
 146 Tackett, 653 A.2d at 259 (quoting Friction Div. Prods., Inc. v. E.I. Du Pont De 
Nemours & Co., 117 F.R.D. 535, 538 (D. Del. 1987)). 
 147 Id. 
 148 Id. 
 149 Id. 
 150 Id. at 260. 
 151 Id. at 258. 
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Without access to the complete file, the Tacketts would be unable 
to challenge State Farm’s assertions and would be forced to 
accept as true its claim of routine handling.152 
The Tackett court, therefore, recognized that “[a] party cannot force 
an insurer to waive the protections of the attorney-client privilege 
merely by bringing a bad faith claim.”153 The court also emphasized 
that the standard for waiver is “exacting,”154 and warned that its 
holding “does not create a rule of per se waiver of the attorney-client 
privilege in insurance bad faith cases.”155 
The court expressly rejected the notion that it was creating a 
rule of per se waiver of the attorney-client privilege in insurance bad-
faith cases.156  The court observed, however, that where an insurance 
company “makes factual representations which implicitly rely upon 
legal advice as justification for non-payment of claims, the insurer 
cannot shield itself from disclosure of the complete advice of counsel 
relevant to the handling of the claim.”157  At issue in Tackett was the 
advice State Farm received from its outside counsel, which was 
contained within the State Farm claim file.  In its internal evaluation 
report, a State Farm claims representative had evaluated the Tacketts’ 
settlement demand and supporting documentation, and concluded 
that the claim was valued at between $45,000 and $50,000.158  State 
Farm established a $50,000 reserve on the claim but ordered an 
independent medical examination (IME) because it was possible that 
a previous accident had contributed to the insured’s condition.159  
 
 152 Tackett, 653 A.2d at 260. 
 153 Id. at 259. 
 154 Id. 
 155 Id. at 260. 
 156 Id.  Tellingly, several subsequent Delaware cases applying Tackett have held that 
insurers have not waived the privilege by denying bad faith.  See Clausen v. Nat’l 
Grange Mut. Ins. Co., 730 A.2d 133, 143 (Del. Super. Ct. 1997) (holding no waiver 
where insurer merely “denied having no reasonable justification for its actions”); 
Ruger v. Commonwealth Land Title Ins. Co., No. 93C-04-210, 1996 WL 769793, at *6 
(Del. Super. Ct. Nov. 27, 1996) (no waiver where insurer did not assert affirmative 
defenses and merely asserted in a letter that its policy interpretation was proper 
without any partial disclosure of facts); Kemper Ins. v. Soligo, No. 95 C-08-266-WTQ, 
1996 WL 944919, at *1-*2 (Del. Super. Ct. May 9, 1996) (holding no waiver, even 
though privileged communications conceivably could have been implicated, where 
insurer asserted medical expert opinion as reasonable justification for claims 
handling).  But see Wolhar v. Gen. Motors Corp., 712 A.2d 457 (Del. 1997) (“The 
Court cannot permit [a litigant] to make bare, factual allegations that are central to 
the dispute between the parties and then permit [it] to assert the attorney-client 
privilege as a barrier to the better understanding of the factual situation.”). 
 157 Tackett, 653 A.2d at 260. 
 158 Id. 
 159 Id. at 257. 
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State Farm’s outside counsel, however, reported that “the possible 
benefit of an independent medical examination is questionable.”160  
Outside counsel also advised the State Farm claims representative 
that “the arbitrator would probably find the [Tacketts’] claim had a 
value of $50,000 or more even though it has some obvious 
disabilities.”161  The doctor performing the IME notified State Farm 
that “Mrs. Tackett does not have any impressive neurological signs,” 
but that the accident in question did trigger a prior back condition.162  
As a result of the IME findings, State Farm authorized a payment of 
$30,000 and made an initial offer of $20,000.163  The settlement offer 
was rejected, and counsel for the insured repeated a prior demand 
for the policy limits.164  Shortly thereafter, the file was transferred to a 
new claims superintendent.165  The new claims superintendent 
concluded, after a full review of the claims file, that State Farm had 
undervalued the claim.  Therefore, a written offer of policy limits was 
sent to the Tacketts’ attorney.166  Although the court determined that 
State Farm had waived the attorney-client privilege, the finding of 
waiver did not automatically relinquish the protection provided by 
the work product doctrine.167  Recognizing the landscape of this 
debate,168 the court rejected the contention that Federal Rule of Civil 
Procedure 26(b)(3) grants absolute immunity to opinion work 
 
 160 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 161 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 162 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 163 Tackett, 653 A.2d at 257. 
 164 Id. 
 165 Id. 
 166 Id. 
 167 Id. at 260. 
 168 The court in Tackett observed: 
On the one hand, courts continually seek to provide an atmosphere in 
which clients may have unfettered communications with counsel, and 
in which attorneys may freely develop a client’s case without undue 
interference from opposing counsel.  On the other hand, a bad faith 
claim against an insurer cannot be proven without sufficient access to 
the claim file which frequently contains opinion work product. 
Id. at 261 (citations omitted).  This dilemma has “generated significant commentary 
and a conflict among courts when deciding whether to allow a party to discover 
opinion work product.”  Id.; see, e.g., Andrea L. Borgford, Comment, The Protected 
Status of Opinion Work Product: A Misconduct Exception, 68 WASH. L. REV. 881 (1993); 
Papetti, supra note 3; Donna Goodin Payne, Note, Insurer Bad Faith: The Need for an 
Exception to the Attorney-Client Privilege, 11 REV. LITIG. 111 (1991); Jayne E. Powell & 
Ellen L. Lyons, Alaska Supreme Court Year in Review 1990, 8 ALASKA L. REV. 70 (1990); 
see also Diego C. Asencio, F.S. 624.155 Actions: The Expanding Field of Claimants, Claims 
and Complexities, 9 TRIAL ADVOC. Q. 31, 37 (1990); Nielsen, supra note 15; Thomas E. 
Workman, Plaintiff’s Right to the Claim File, Other Claim Files and Related Information: The 
Ticket to the Gold Mine, 25 TORT & INS. L.J. 137 (1988). 
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product.  Thus, the court declined to read the mandatory language 
of the rule as establishing an impenetrable barrier to discovery of 
opinion work product.169 
2. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v. Lee 
(Arizona) 
In State Farm Mutual Auto. Insurance Co. v. Lee,170 the Arizona 
Supreme Court explored the contours of the “at issue” implied waiver 
doctrine as it related to the attorney-client privilege.171 
In Lee, a class representing approximately one thousand State 
Farm insureds brought suit against State Farm contesting the 
systematic denial of uninsured and underinsured motorist coverage 
stacking claims.172  Between 1988 and 1995, State Farm rejected 
stacking173 claims in single loss situations.  It was State Farm’s practice 
 
 169 Tackett, 635 A.2d at 262. 
 170 13 P.3d 1169 (Ariz. 2000). 
 171 Arizona law provides that information contained in communications between 
attorney and client in the context of the attorney-client relationship is confidential if 
maintained in confidence.  ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 12-2234 (2003). Generally, the Arizona 
courts “construe privilege statutes narrowly because they exclude relevant evidence 
and impede the fact-finder’s search for the truth.”  Blazek v. Superior Court, 869 
P.2d 509, 511 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1994); see also Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day 
Saints v. Superior Court, 764 P.2d 759, 764 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1988).  This is consistent 
with the law of other jurisdictions.  See, e.g., United States v. Mierzwicki, 500 F. Supp. 
1331, 1334 (D. Md. 1980) (“Any examination of the attorney-client privilege should 
begin with the observation that privileges are not favored in the law and are seen as a 
hinderance to litigation.”); League v. Vanice, 374 N.W.2d 849, 856 (Neb. 1985); 
Cohen v. Jenkintown Cab Co., 257 A.2d 689, 693-94 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1976); 
MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 77, at 156 (Edward W. Cleary ed., 2d ed. 1972) (noting 
that privilege serves only to “shut out the light”). 
Under Arizona law, the attorney-client privilege belongs to the client and serves 
“to encourage free exchange of information between the attorney and the client to 
promote the administration of justice.”  State v. Holsinger, 601 P.2d 1054, 1058 (Ariz. 
1979).  The privilege encourages clients to tell their lawyers the truth.  “Unless the 
lawyer knows the truth, he or she cannot be of much assistance to the client.”  
Samaritan Found. v. Goodfarb, 862 P.2d 870, 874 (Ariz. 1993).  Thus, the privilege 
under Arizona law is “central to the delivery of legal services.”  Id.  The privilege, 
however, may be waived either expressly or implicitly if the person that holds the 
privilege voluntarily discloses information within its purview.  Danielson v. Superior 
Court, 754 P.2d 1145, 1148-49 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1987). 
 172 Lee, 13 P.3d at 1171. 
 173 There are two types of stacking in the automobile insurance context.  Intra-
policy stacking can occur when the stated per person policy limits are multiplied by 
the number of vehicles covered by the policy.  Courts in other jurisdictions have 
permitted this type of stacking.  See, e.g., Allstate Ins. Co. v. Randall, 753 F.2d 441 (5th 
Cir. 1985) (applying Mississippi law); Am. Ins. Co. v. Takahashi, 575 P.2d 881 (Haw. 
1978); Chaffee v. United States Fid. & Guar. Co., 591 P.2d 1102 (Mont. 1979); 
Allstate Ins. Co. v. Maglish, 586 P.2d 313 (Nev. 1978); Am. States Ins. Co. v. Milton, 
573 P.2d 367 (Wash. 1978).  Professor Long, in his treatise on liability insurance law, 
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to issue separate insurance policies covering each vehicle in a 
multiple vehicle household.174  When losses occurred for which there 
were insufficient insurance funds to compensate the insured from the 
other tortfeasor’s insurance policies, the State Farm class members 
presented underinsured motorist claims to State Farm for additional 
compensation.175  State Farm rejected these claims based on the 
wording of A.R.S. § 20-259.01(H),176 which permitted insurance 
companies to use anti-stacking policy clauses to eliminate stacking.177  
In 1995, however, the Arizona Supreme Court, in State Farm Mutual 
Insurance Co. v. Lindsey,178 determined that the anti-stacking language 
 
commented on this type of policy limit stacking: 
The most common rationale used by courts in permitting intra-policy 
stacking is that a combination of the limits of liability clause and the 
payment of separate premiums creates an ambiguity, which must, of 
course, be construed against the insurer.  An argument (in addition to 
the statute) is that since a premium was paid for the coverage, claimant 
is entitled to the coverage.  Since the coverage is a contract benefit 
which has been paid for, plaintiff is not seeking a windfall as a result of 
his injury, but full indemnity based on payment of separate premiums.  
When separate premiums are paid, and allocated, for each vehicle 
listed, considerations of equity apply.  As stated by Professor Widiss: 
A premium has been paid for each of the endorsements 
and coverage has been issued.  It seems both equitable 
and desirable to permit recovery under more than one 
endorsement until the claimant is fully indemnified. 
3 ROWLAND H. LONG, THE LAW OF LIABILITY INSURANCE § 24.27 (1990) (footnotes 
omitted) (quoting A. WIDISS, A GUIDE TO UNINSURED MOTORIST COVERAGE 112 
(1969)).  However, the Arizona courts do not permit this type of stacking.  See, e.g., 
Hampton v. Allstate Ins. Co., 616 P.2d 78 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1980).  The court in 
Hampton rejected the insured’s argument that stacking should be permitted because a 
separate premium was charged for the coverage available on each vehicle.  In 
responding to this argument, the court found that the individual premium charge 
was justified because of the additional risk associated with covering multiple vehicles.  
Id. at 80-81. 
Interpolicy stacking arises in multi-policy situations.  “Other insurance” clauses 
are typically used by the insurance industry to eliminate the stacking of coverages in 
multiple-policy situations.  The typical anti-stacking clause contains two essential 
provisions.  First, the policy requires coverage to be prorated.  Second, the policy 
establishes a total coverage limit available for the loss to which the prorated 
percentage applies.  Unless the policy places a limit on the amount of the loss, 
stacking can occur.  See, e.g., Barrett v. Farmer’s Ins. Group, 220 Cal. Rptr. 135 (Ct. 
App. 1985); Menke v. Country Mut. Ins. Co., 386 N.E.2d 1133 (Ill. App. Ct. 1979); 
Bishop v. Washington, 480 A.2d 1088 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1984). 
 174 Lee, 13 P.3d at 1171. 
 175 Id. 
 176 ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 20-259.01(H) (2003) (formerly ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 20-
259.01(F)). 
 177 Id. 
 178 897 P.2d 631 (Ariz. 1995). 
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used by State Farm was legally insufficient to prevent stacking.179 
The class member insureds argued that even before the court’s 
decision in Lindsey, State Farm knew the anti-stacking clause was 
invalid.180  Therefore, State Farm acted in bad faith when, from 1988 
to 1997, State Farm denied its insureds’ requests to stack coverage.181  
State Farm maintained that until Lindsey was decided, it had acted 
reasonably in interpreting A.R.S. § 20-259.01(H) in conjunction with 
its policy language in order to preclude stacking.182 
During discovery State Farm acknowledged having received the 
advice of counsel regarding whether to pay or reject class member 
claims.183  State Farm asserted the attorney-client privilege regarding 
the production of counsel’s coverage analysis, but declared that it 
would not advance a good faith defense based on the advice of 
counsel.184  The trial court accepted State Farm’s position that it 
would not advance an advice-of-counsel defense directly.185  Thus, 
 
 179 In Lindsey, the court held that the provisions of ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 20-259.01(F) 
(now, subsection (H)) are not self-executing because the wording of the statute is 
merely permissive.  897 P.2d at 633.  To be effective, “[a]dditional policy language is 
needed to incorporate the limitation into a policy.”  Id. 
The importance of having appropriate court “anti-stacking” language in the 
policy was demonstrated in State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v. Herron, 599 
P.2d 768 (Ariz. 1979), where the insurance company argued that stacking was 
prohibited under Arizona law generally: “[A]ppellee argues that the law of Arizona 
does not allow ‘stacking’ of uninsured motorist coverages and that appellant may not 
collect an additional $35,000 under the provisions of his own policy because this 
would constitute ‘stacking’.”  Id. at 771.  In rejecting this argument, the court stated: 
“We recognized the elementary principle of contract law that if one wishes to buy 
more coverage, he may do so and the extent of that coverage will depend on the 
terms of the contract.”  Id.  The “other insurance” clause in Herron was an excess type 
and did not preclude stacking.  Indeed, the court in Herron acknowledged that the 
case did not involve a stacking question.  Id. at 772.  The court gave effect to the 
excess clause.  Id. at 772-73. 
 180 Lee, 13 P.3d at 1172. 
 181 Id. 
 182 Id.  State Farm argued that its position rejecting stacking was not unreasonable 
because of the unsettled status of Arizona law.  State Farm cited Giannini v. State Farm 
Mutual Automobile Insurance Co., 837 P.2d 1203, 1206 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1992), in which 
Division One held that the anti-stacking provision in State Farm’s policy was 
sufficient to invoke the statute and precluded stacking.  See also State Farm Mut. 
Auto. Ins. Co. v. Lindsey, 885 P.2d 144, 150 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1994) (Division One again 
holding that anti-stacking provision in State Farm’s policies “plainly encompass[es 
the statute’s] limitation on stacking”).  But see State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. 
Berardi, No. 2 CA-CV 93-0051 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1993) (mem.), review denied, (Mar. 16, 
1994) (Division Two requiring State Farm to permit stacking of policyholder’s 
uninsured motorist/underinsured motorist claims). 
 183 Lee, 13 P.3d at 1172. 
 184 Id.  The documents involved communications with 15 different law firms.  Id. 
 185 Id. at 1173. 
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State Farm would not be able to rely upon the objective 
reasonableness of its decision to deny stacking.186  State Farm did 
assert the subjective good faith of its claims managers in deciding to 
deny stacking, and argued that their beliefs were reasonable in light 
of their understanding of the law at that time.187  Because State Farm 
avowed to the trial court “that it would defend in part on what its 
decisionmakers knew, thought and did,” the trial court determined 
that State Farm’s knowledge “included advice of counsel because that 
was a part of the basis for the defense.”188  The trial court held, 
therefore, “that State Farm impliedly waived the privilege when it put 
at issue the subjective legal knowledge of its managers after they 
sought and received legal advice.”189 
The Arizona Court of Appeals accepted jurisdiction and vacated 
the trial court’s discovery order.190  The court of appeals held that 
State Farm had not impliedly waived the privilege or put its attorney-
client communications at issue because it had only refuted plaintiff’s 
allegations, and had not injected privilege-related issues into the 
case.191  As a threshold matter, the court adopted192 the three-prong 
test for “at issue” implied waivers set forth in Hearn v. Rhay.193 
The Arizona Supreme Court rejected the view that implied 
waiver will be found only when the party advances an express claim of 
reliance on advice of counsel.194  The court noted that if the client’s 
intent not to abandon the privilege could alone control the situation, 
then waiver would seldom be found.195  Thus, the determination of 
 
 186 Id. 
 187 Id. 
 188 Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). 
 189 Lee, 13 P.3d at 1173. 
 190 In discovery matters, Arizona trial judges have broad discretion, and their 
decisions are reviewed only for abuse.  See Brown v. Superior Court, 670 P.2d 725, 
729 (Ariz. 1983). 
 191 Lee, 13 P.3d at 1173. 
 192 Id. 
 193 68 F.R.D. 574, 581 (E.D. Wash. 1975).  Hearn involved a prisoner plaintiff’s 
claim that the government had violated his constitutional rights by confining him to 
a mental health unit without a hearing or review.  Id. at 577.  The government 
asserted the defense of qualified immunity, alleging that it acted in the good-faith 
belief that its actions did not violate any clearly established constitutional right.  Id.  
The government expressly disavowed reliance on advice of counsel.  Id. at 581 n.5.  
Nonetheless, the Hearn court found that the assertion of the defense was an 
affirmative act that made the government’s communication with counsel relevant, 
and the denial of access to those communications would have been manifestly unfair 
to the plaintiff.  Id. at 581-82. 
 194 Lee, 13 P.3d at 1178. 
 195 Id. (citing 8 JOHN H. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 2327, at 
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whether implied waiver has occurred also includes an objective 
consideration: when one’s conduct reaches a “certain point of 
disclosure,” fairness demands that the privilege be waived regardless 
of the privileged person’s intentions.196  Turning to this inquiry, the 
court recognized that there was “a great deal of confusion” in this 
area, and then quoted the Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing 
Lawyers in describing various approaches used in other jurisdictions: 
At least three approaches to the waiver [issue exist]: The first 
approach radically holds that, whenever a party seeks judicial 
relief, the party impliedly waives the privilege.  A second approach 
would attempt to balance the need for disclosure against the need 
for protecting the confidentiality of the client’s communications 
on the facts of the individual case.  The third approach avoids the 
extremes of an over-inclusive automatic-waiver rule or an 
indeterminate, ad hoc balancing approach.  Instead, it focuses on 
whether the client asserting the privilege has interjected the issue 
into the litigation and whether the claim of privilege, if upheld, 
would deny the inquiring party access to proof needed fairly to 
resist the client’s own evidence on that very issue.197 
Privilege is waived under the first two views “whenever a client’s 
mental state was in issue.”198  The court observed that this approach 
was “dubious absent acceptance of the Benthamite principle that the 
privilege ought to be overthrown to facilitate the search for truth.”199  
The court in Lee adopted the third, intermediate approach as being 
least restrictive of the three approaches outlined above.200  By 
adopting this approach, the court “reject[ed] the idea that the mere 
filing of a bad faith action, the denial of bad faith, or the affirmative 
claim of good faith may be found to constitute an implied waiver of 
the privilege.”201  Waiver will occur, however, if the privileged party 
has asserted a claim or defense—for example, that its evaluation of 
the law was reasonable—which would include, necessarily, the 
information received from its counsel.202  At that point the privileged 
party has injected “the issue of advice of counsel into the litigation to 
the extent that recognition of the privilege would deny the opposing 
 
636 (J. McNaughton rev. ed. 1961)). 
 196 Id.  The court in Lee questioned where that “certain point” is reached in which 
fairness requires waiver.  Id. at 1178-79. 
 197 Id. at 1179 (internal citations omitted) (citing RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE 
LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 80 cmt. b (1998)). 
 198 Id. 
 199 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 200 Lee, 13 P.3d at 1179. 
 201 Id. 
 202 Id. 
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party access to proof without which it would be impossible for the 
factfinder to fairly determine the very issue raised by that party.”203 
The court in Lee concluded that the “certain point” at which 
fairness requires waiver is reached when “the party asserting the 
privilege claims its conduct was proper and permitted by law and 
based in whole or in part on its evaluation of the state of the law.”204  
When this occurs, the privileged party’s knowledge about the law 
becomes central, and the advice of its counsel, highly relevant to the 
legal implications of the privileged party’s conduct.205  In this 
situation, “the truth cannot be found absent exploration of [the] 
issue.”206  A contrary finding would result in “unfairness not just to the 
party opposing assertion of the privilege but to the entire [judicial] 
system.”207 
Preemptively, the majority focused on Justice Martone’s 
dissenting opinion.  The court agreed with the dissent that it was the 
plaintiffs who had raised the issue of subjective bad faith among State 
Farm’s employees, but noted that the waiver of the privilege was not 
based on State Farm’s denial of that allegation.208  Further, State 
Farm’s affirmative assertion of good faith did not waive the 
privilege.209  The court then identified the basis for its decision: 
It is, rather, State Farm’s affirmative assertion that its actions were 
reasonable because of its evaluation of the law, based on its 
interpretation of the policies, statutes, and case law, and because 
of what its personnel actually knew and did. 
 But what its personnel did, presumably among other things, was 
to consult counsel and obtain counsel’s views of the meaning of 
the policies, statutes, and case law.  Having asserted that its 
actions were reasonable because of what it knew about the 
applicable law, State Farm has put in issue the information it 
obtained from counsel.210 
Although State Farm did not specifically state that legal “advice 
was relevant to the legal significance of its conduct,”211 an assertion 
that the insurance company relied upon advice of counsel would be 
 
 203 Id. 
 204 Id. at 1178, 1179. 
 205 Id. at 1179. 
 206 Lee, 13 P.3d at 1179. 
 207 Id. 
 208 Id. at 1181. 
 209 Id. 
 210 Id. at 1180-81. 
 211 Id. at 1181. 
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“the functional equivalent of an express advice-of-counsel defense.”212  
The court noted that “[m]ost sophisticated litigants [would] know 
better than to dig that hole for themselves.”213  The concept of 
implied waiver does not “require such a magical admission,” nor does 
it require the court to “accept as dispositive the client’s assertion that 
it did not rely on the advice it received.”214  The majority found that a 
contrary holding would make “a mockery of the law.”215  On the one 
hand, an insurance company could argue “that it acted reasonably 
because it made a legal evaluation from which it concluded that the 
law permitted it to act in a certain manner,”216 while, on the other 
hand, it would allow that same insurance company “to withhold from 
its adversary and the factfinder information it received from counsel 
on that very subject.”217  In that situation, “[t]he sword and shield 
metaphor would truly apply.”218 
The court found that “[b]y asserting the subjective evaluation 
and understanding of its personnel about the state of the law on 
stacking, State Farm has affirmatively injected the legal knowledge of 
its claims managers into the litigation and put the extent, and thus 
the sources, of this legal knowledge at issue.”219  Thus, the insurance 
company will be precluded from testifying “that they investigated the 
state of the law and concluded [that they] believed they were acting 
within the law but deny Plaintiffs the ability to explore the basis for 
this belief and to determine whether [the insurance company] might 
have known its actions did not conform to the law.”220 
The court, however, limited the scope of its ruling.  As an 
example, the court noted that its holding did not have the effect of 
waiving the privilege for communications between the insurer and 
outside counsel on subjects merely pertaining to the legal question at 
issue.221  In essence, 
[p]laintiffs are not entitled to a fishing expedition through all of 
counsel’s communications . . . but only to discovery of those 
communications pertaining to the permissibility or deniability of 
the [legal issue] under the policy language, the case law, and the 
 
 212 Lee, 13 P.3d at 1181. 
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statutes as they existed at the time the claims were presented.222 
Ultimately, the court held that the trial judge had not 
committed legal error or abused his discretion by permitting 
discovery of attorney-client privileged materials.223  The court also 
approved the Hearn test,224 and adopted the test set forth in 
Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers § 80(1), which 
provides, in relevant part, that: 
The attorney-client privilege is waived for any relevant 
communication if the client asserts as to a material issue in a 
proceeding that: 
(a)the client acted upon the advice of a lawyer or that the advice 
was otherwise relevant to the legal significance of the client’s 
conduct . . . .225 
The court rejected the notion “that the mere filing of a bad faith 
action, the denial of bad faith, or the affirmative claim of good faith 
may be found to constitute an implied waiver of the privilege.”226  The 
court found that a party does not waive the attorney-client privilege 
unless it has asserted some claim or defense, such as the 
reasonableness of its evaluation of the law, which necessarily 
includes the information received from counsel.  In that situation, 
the party claiming the privilege has interjected the issue of advice 
of counsel into the litigation to the extent that recognition of the 
privilege would deny the opposing party access to proof without 
which it would be impossible for the factfinder to fairly determine 
the very issue raised by that party.  We believe such a point is 
reached when, as in the present case, the party asserting the 
privilege claims its conduct was proper and permitted by law and 
based in whole or in part on its evaluation of the state of the law.  
In that situation, the party’s knowledge about the law is vital, and 
the advice of counsel is highly relevant to the legal significance of 
the client’s conduct.  Add to that the fact that the truth cannot be 
found absent exploration of that issue, and the conditions of 
RESTATEMENT § 80 are met.227 
The deposition of Gillespie, State Farm’s Tucson claims 
superintendent, demonstrated the unfairness of this aspect of the 
judicial system.  The review of the deposition indicated that Gillespie 
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 223 Id. at 1184. 
 224 See Lee, 13 P.3d at 1173. 
 225 Id. at 1179 (emphasis omitted) (quoting RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW 
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 227 Id. 
  
560 SETON HALL LAW REVIEW Vol. 34:513 
had little or no legal knowledge except that which was supplied to 
him by State Farm’s counsel.228  When Gillespie was asked to describe 
the legal training that State Farm had given him to qualify him to 
make the evaluation in question, Gillespie indicated that he could 
not recall what training he had.229  When asked whether there were 
any sources that opposing counsel could look to in order to 
determine what legal information would have been available to 
Gillespie apart from the advice he received from counsel, Gillespie 
indicated there were no other sources.230  The court found that by 
asserting the subjective evaluation and understanding of its personnel 
about the state of the law on stacking, State Farm had affirmatively 
injected the legal knowledge of its claims managers into the litigation 
and put the extent, and thus the sources, of that legal knowledge at 
issue.231  The court found that “State Farm’s claims managers [could 
not] testify that they investigated the state of the law and concluded 
and believed they were acting within the law but deny Plaintiffs the 
ability to explore the basis for this belief and to determine whether it 
might have known its actions did not conform to the law.”232 
State Farm argued that it injected the subjective belief of its 
claims personnel into the litigation because the plaintiffs had alleged 
State Farm not only misinterpreted the law but did so knowingly.233  
Thus, State Farm argued that the plaintiffs, and not State Farm, had 
injected the issue of subjective belief into the litigation.234  After 
acknowledging that it would be difficult for State Farm to meet 
plaintiffs’ allegation without affirmatively alleging that it had 
investigated and evaluated the law,235 the court stated that State Farm 
could have done so simply by denying that it knew it was acting 
unlawfully and relying on a defense of objective reasonableness.236  
Plaintiffs would then be forced to prove State Farm knew it was acting 
unlawfully.237 
Justice Martone vigorously dissented from the majority’s 
holding.  The Justice prefaced his dissent by acknowledging and 
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agreeing with the majority that the Restatement and the Hearn tests 
set forth the appropriate rule when a client impliedly waives the 
attorney-client privilege by putting assistance or communication in 
issue.238  Having made these concessions, the dissent observed that the 
Restatement and Hearn analyses requires the privilege holder and not 
the other party to the litigation to affirmatively inject an issue that 
implicates privileged communications.  The dissent emphasized that 
the Restatement approach required that either of two conditions be 
met: “[T]he client acted upon the advice of a lawyer or that the advice 
was otherwise relevant to the legal significance of the client’s conduct.”239  In 
that regard, it did not suffice “that the advice was otherwise relevant 
to the legal significance of the client’s conduct.”240  Rather, the 
dissent noted that the Restatement requires the client to “assert that 
the advice was otherwise relevant to the legal significance of the 
client’s conduct.”241 
In Arizona, a bad-faith claim “requires proof of both objective 
and subjective unreasonableness on the part of the insurer.”242  The 
plaintiff, not the privilege holder insurance company, determines 
whether to put at issue the subjective reasonableness of defendant’s 
conduct.243  In fact, “the plaintiff must inject the issue of subjective 
unreasonableness into the litigation.”244  This is so because under the 
Noble/Zilisch test for bad faith in Arizona, “[t]he appropriate inquiry 
is whether there is sufficient evidence from which reasonable jurors 
could conclude that in the investigation, evaluation, and processing 
of the claim, the insurer acted unreasonably and either knew or was 
conscious of the fact that its conduct was unreasonable.”245  The dissent 
criticized the majority because the majority ruling requires a bad-faith 
defendant to choose between defending against both prongs of the 
Noble/Zilisch test, and thereby waiving the attorney-client privilege, or 
defending solely on the objective reasonableness of its decision.246 
The practical consequence of the majority’s ruling would be that 
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no bad-faith defendant could properly defend the action without 
waiving the privilege.  In that regard, the majority’s application of 
Hearn and the Restatement in the context of the bad-faith case before 
it, completely subverted the critical elements of each test. 
The dissent observed that “[u]nder the majority view, a plaintiff 
may abrogate the defendant’s attorney-client privilege simply by 
raising a bad faith claim on any matter regarding an interpretation of 
the law.”247  The dissent further observed that “it may well be that an 
insurer would be willing to make a coverage decision without relying 
on the advice of its lawyers.  But the prudent insurer will consult a 
lawyer and under today’s decision that advice always will be 
admissible in an action against it claiming bad faith.”248  Justice 
 
 247 Id. 
 248 Lee, 13 P.3d at 1185 (Martone, J., dissenting).  Justice McGregor’s dissent 
points to the slippery slope that was created by the majority’s opinion: 
But today’s holding, which applies not only to plaintiffs’ bad faith 
claim, but also to the counts alleging fraud, will sweep even more 
broadly.  If a defendant can waive the privilege simply by relying upon 
knowledge gained, in part, through advice of counsel to deny a 
plaintiff’s allegations, any plaintiff advancing a subjective claim will run 
the risk of waiving the privilege simply by filing an action.  A plaintiff 
who advances a subjective claim seemingly will waive the privilege if, 
before asserting his claim, he consults with his lawyer and uses the 
knowledge obtained to reasonably evaluate his claim.  Because many, 
perhaps most, potential litigants do not know the elements of claims 
they seek to assert before consulting a lawyer, and do not understand 
whether they possess sufficient basis to assert a claim, a plaintiff’s 
decision to proceed with an action necessarily relies upon the advice of 
counsel.  For instance, these plaintiffs presumably consulted with their 
attorneys before bringing this action for bad faith, which involves the 
subjective element described by the majority.  If so, their reliance on 
their “subjective and alleged reasonable evaluation of the law—but an 
evaluation that necessarily incorporates what the litigant learned from 
its lawyer [renders] the communication . . . discoverable and 
admissible.”  Can the defendant now discover otherwise privileged 
communications to determine whether the plaintiffs in fact had a basis 
for making their claim?  Similarly, a plaintiff in a personal injury action 
who claims subjective damages for pain and suffering could be found 
to have waived the attorney-client privilege if the knowledge on which 
she bases her claim and right to bring it derive, at least in part, from 
communications with counsel.  If bringing the claim does not itself 
waive the privilege, is an assertion from the defendant that the plaintiff 
lacked a good faith basis for bringing the claim sufficient to waive the 
privilege?  And if the defendant’s assertion alone does not waive the 
privilege, surely, in the words of the majority opinion, the plaintiff’s 
denial of the argument that he lacked a good faith basis for his claims 
constitutes an attempt “to establish [his] mental state by asserting that 
[he] acted after investigating the law and reaching a well-founded 
belief that the law permitted the action [he] took . . . .” 
Id. at 1186-87 (McGregor, J., dissenting) (internal citations omitted). 
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McGregor, who dissented but wrote separately, delivered a eulogy for 
the attorney-client privilege because of the majority’s decision: 
Today we make the scope of the attorney-client privilege 
uncertain, at best, and abrogate the privilege in many instances, at 
worst. . . . To permit plaintiffs to discover communications that 
they quite probably do not need to establish their claim, we have 
placed in jeopardy countless attorney-client communications, 
which litigants rightly anticipated would be confidential.  We also 
have introduced needless uncertainty into the attorney-client 
relationship, and have discouraged persons from seeking needed 
legal advice, which they cannot assume will remain confidential.249 
3. Boone v. Vanliner Insurance Co. (Ohio) 
The attorney-client privilege has long been recognized by the 
Ohio courts.250  In a split decision, however, the Ohio Supreme Court 
in Boone v. Vanliner Insurance Co.251 declared that “in an action alleging 
bad faith denial of insurance coverage, the insured is entitled to 
discover claims file materials containing attorney-client 
communications related to the issue of coverage that were created 
prior to the denial of coverage.”252 
The insured, Richard Boone, was an over-the-road truck driver.253  
He purchased a commercial vehicle liability policy from Vanliner 
Insurance Company254 and a second policy was issued to Boone’s 
employer.255  Both policies provided liability coverage,256 and both 
policies provided underinsured motorist (UIM) coverage.257  Boone 
was involved in a significant trucking accident in which he suffered 
serious injuries.258  The tortfeasor’s insurance company paid Boone 
the maximum of its liability policy limits.259  Because his injuries were 
serious, Boone then presented UIM claims to Vanliner under both 
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the employer’s and Boone’s individual policies.260  Vanliner denied 
coverage under the employer’s policy, asserting an exclusion which 
Vanliner believed precluded UIM coverage for the accident.261 
Boone filed a declaratory judgment action against Vanliner and 
included a claim for bad faith.262  Boone alleged that the insurer 
lacked a reasonable justification for denying UIM coverage.263  
Through discovery, Boone sought access to Vanliner’s claims file.264  
Vanliner initially denied that UIM coverage was available under the 
employer’s policy.265  After Boone sought discovery of Vanliner’s 
claims file, Vanliner changed its position and admitted that the 
employer’s policy provided UIM coverage.266  Following this 
admission of coverage, Vanliner moved for a protective order 
regarding numerous privileged documents in its claims file.267  The 
trial court held an in camera inspection of the Vanliner claims file,268 
and ordered partial disclosure of the privileged documents identified 
by Vanliner.269 
The Ohio Supreme Court began its analysis in Boone270 by 
reviewing its prior decision in Moskovitz v. Mt. Sinai Medical Center.271  
In Moskovitz, the plaintiffs in a medical malpractice lawsuit sought 
prejudgment interest as authorized by Ohio Revised Code § 
1343.03(C).272  Under this statutory provision, the prevailing party in 
the underlying case had the burden of proving that the opposing 
party “failed to make a good faith effort to settle” the case, before 
prejudgment interest could be awarded.273 
The Moskovitz court delineated the extent to which a plaintiff 
may seek to discover the contents of a malpractice insurance 
company’s claim file notwithstanding the insurer’s assertion of work 
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product protection and attorney-client privilege.274  The court in 
Moskovitz found that “[d]ocuments and other things showing the lack 
of a good faith effort to settle by a party or the attorneys acting on his 
or her behalf are wholly unworthy of the protections afforded by any claimed 
privilege.”275 
Having reviewed its prior decision in Moskovitz, the court in 
Boone addressed the question of whether claims file materials showing 
an insurer’s lack of good faith in determining coverage were equally 
unworthy of protection.276  In reaching its decision that claims file 
materials showing lack of good faith in an insurer’s decision to deny 
coverage are unworthy of protection,277 the court summarily dismissed 
Vanliner’s argument that its holding would discourage insurance 
companies from seeking legal advice.  The court rejected this 
argument “because it assumes that insurers will violate their duty to 
conduct a thorough investigation by failing, when necessary, to seek 
legal counsel regarding whether an insured’s claim is covered under 
the policy of insurance, in order to avoid the insured later having 
access to such communications, through discovery.”278 
The court in Boone limited its holding to only attorney-client 
communications and work product documents created prior to the 
denial of coverage.279  Although the lack of a good faith effort to settle 
involves continuing conduct throughout the entire claims process, “a 
lack of good faith in determining coverage involves conduct that 
occurs when assessment of coverage is being considered.”280 
Three Justices of the Ohio Supreme Court dissented in Boone.  
The dissent stated that the “unworthy of protection” rationale 
espoused by the majority was unsupported in Moskovitz and is 
unsupported now.281  The dissent began its analysis by stating its 
allegiance to the public policy considerations underlying the 
attorney-client privilege, namely, the encouragement of “full and 
frank communication between attorneys and their clients” to 
“promote broader public interests in the observance of law and the 
administration of justice.”282  The dissent observed that there are 
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already safeguards in place that prevent abuse of the attorney-client 
privilege.283  Particularly, communications in furtherance of a crime 
or fraud are not deserving of protection.284  By adopting its “unworthy 
of protection” rationale, however, the majority likened 
communications in furtherance of civil fraud with an insurance 
company’s communications with its attorney before the denial of 
coverage,285 without recognizing that a conceptual difference exists 
between bad faith and civil fraud.  As the dissent noted, 
[B]ad faith by an insurer is conceptually different from fraud.  
Bad-faith denial of insurance coverage means merely that the 
insurer lacked a “reasonable justification” for denying a claim.  In 
contrast, an actionable claim of fraud requires proof of a false 
statement made with intent to mislead.  Proof of an insurer’s bad 
faith in denying coverage does not require proof of any false or 
misleading statements; an insurer could, for example, act in bad 
faith by denying coverage without explanation.  Because bad faith 
is not inherently similar to fraud, there is no reason why an 
allegation of bad faith should result in an exception to the 
attorney-client privilege akin to the crime-fraud exception.286 
The dissent addressed what it perceived was the “startling” 
practical effect of the majority’s holding: 
 The majority’s holding is also startling for its practical effect.  
After today’s decision, an insured need only allege the insurer’s 
bad faith in the complaint in order to discover communications 
between the insurer and the insurer’s attorney.  Not even an 
allegation of the crime-fraud exception’s applicability carries such 
an absolute entitlement to discovery of attorney-client 
communications.  In order to overcome the attorney-client 
privilege based on the crime-fraud exception, a party must 
demonstrate “a factual basis for a showing of probable cause to 
believe that a crime or fraud has been committed and that the 
communications were in furtherance of the crime or fraud.”  The 
rule created today requires no similar prima facie showing of bad 
faith before an insured is entitled to discover attorney-client 
communications of the insurer. The result of the majority’s 
decision is a categorical exception to the attorney-client privilege 
applicable in any case alleging a bad-faith denial of insurance 
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coverage.  This is a sweeping exception that a number of courts 
have refused to adopt.287 
Finally, the dissent found that the majority’s holding that 
insurance company communications were unworthy of the attorney-
client privilege was inconsistent with the purpose of the privilege.288  
The dissent stated that 
the privilege is designed to encourage open discussion between 
attorney and client, so as to promote the observance of the law 
and allow an attorney to adequately advise the client.  With 
today’s decision, the majority declares that an insurer’s 
consultation with an attorney prior to a denial of coverage does 
not fall within this purpose.  The rule laid down today assumes that 
an insurer will always have some sinister intent to act in bad faith when it 
discusses a coverage decision with its attorney.  But the majority 
overlooks the fact that an insurance company may consult with 
legal counsel to obtain legal advice about a coverage decision.  
“[A]n insurance company’s retention of legal counsel to interpret 
the policy, investigate the details surrounding the damage, and to 
determine whether the insurance company is bound for all or 
some of the damage, is a ‘classic example of a client seeking legal 
advice from an attorney.’”  These types of communications 
further the purpose of the attorney-client privilege and should be 
protected in the same manner as a communication by any other 
client seeking legal advice from an attorney.289 
Insurance companies, the dissent wrote, “should be free to seek legal 
advice in cases where coverage is unclear without fearing that the 
communications necessary to obtain that advice will later become 
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available” to a dissatisfied insured.290  The majority’s holding would 
have a chilling effect on an insurance company seeking legal advice.291  
The uninhibited flow of information between the insurance company 
and its attorney facilitates the accurate assessment of coverage.292 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
An insurance company should not lose the protection of the 
attorney-client privilege simply because its litigation opponent raises 
an issue to which advice of counsel may be relevant.  Implied waiver 
can only occur when the privilege holder affirmatively injects advice 
of counsel into the litigation.  If the privilege holder does not use 
advice of counsel as a sword, there is no basis for stripping him or her 
of its shield.  For this reason, courts throughout the country have 
consistently held that an insurer’s mere denial of a bad-faith 
allegation is not sufficient to waive the attorney-client privilege.293  
Even when a Hearn-type “issue” analysis is applied, more than a mere 
denial has been required to waive the privilege in the context of 
insurance bad faith.  The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals has 
determined that “[t]o waive the attorney-client privilege by 
voluntarily injecting an issue in the case, a defendant must do more 
than merely deny a plaintiff’s allegations.  The holder must inject a 
new factual or legal issue into the case.”294  Merely offering “a new 
form of evidence to counter an issue injected by the plaintiffs,” such 
as bad faith, does not waive the privilege.295  The proposition that an 
insurance company affirmatively argues its good faith ignores the 
principle that good faith in the insurance context is merely the 
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absence of bad faith.  Indeed, as a technical matter, a “bad faith” 
claim is an allegation that the insurer has breached its implied 
covenant of good faith and fair dealing.  Plaintiffs will typically raise 
an insurance company’s good faith, or lack thereof, in their 
complaint, and the insurance company should not waive its privilege 
by denying those allegations.296 
Insureds could simply induce an automatic waiver by accusing an 
insurance company of bad faith.  A claim that an insurance 
company’s “state of mind” is at issue, would lead to a demand to 
examine privileged materials as a matter of “fairness,” on the theory 
that advice of counsel must have contributed to the insurer’s state of 
mind.  The California Court of Appeals convincingly demonstrated 
the flaws of this logic in Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. v. Superior Court.297  
In that case, Aetna brought a declaratory judgment action to 
determine coverage, and its insured counter-claimed, accusing Aetna 
of bad-faith denial of benefits.298  Although the trial court ruled that 
the insured could discover communications between Aetna and 
outside coverage counsel, the California Court of Appeals issued a 
preemptory writ of mandamus overturning that ruling.299  The 
appellate court found that Aetna did not implicitly waive the privilege 
by effectively relying upon advice of counsel as a basis for its actions.  
The court continued: 
‘Aetna is not saying that their conduct was reasonable because their 
counsel opined so, but rather that their conduct was reasonable 
because the facts indicated that no valid claim existed.’ . . . Stated 
differently, Aetna claims it acted as it did not because it was 
advised to do so, but because the advice was, in its view, correct; 
and it is prepared to defend itself on the basis of that asserted 
correctness rather than the mere fact of the advice.  Such a 
defense does not waive the attorney-client privilege.300 
The Aetna court also rejected the insured’s argument that Aetna 
lost its privilege because the insured’s bad-faith claim had put Aetna’s 
“state of mind” at issue.  The court held that argument to be 
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“palpably untenable” because its adoption would eviscerate the 
attorney-client privilege “in a myriad of actions where state of mind is 
an issue or could easily be made one.”301  As the court observed, Aetna 
had not put its state of mind at issue by seeking declaratory relief; 
“[r]ather, it was [the insured] (the party seeking discovery) who put 
Aetna’s state of mind at issue by filing a counter claim for bad faith 
denial of insurance coverage,” and “[i]f [the insured] could in this 
manner waive the privilege on behalf of Aetna . . . bad faith claims 
would surely proliferate as a new device for obtaining discovery.”302 
In Tackett, State Farm’s representation that the claim file showed 
“routine handling” was questionable.  An independent medical 
examination was ordered notwithstanding the advice of State Farm’s 
outside counsel that the possible benefit of the independent medical 
examination was “questionable.”303  In addition, outside counsel 
advised State Farm that the claim had a value at policy limits “or 
more.”304  State Farm proceeded with the IME and also offered sixty 
percent of the claim value as assessed by State Farm’s outside counsel.  
This type of “routine” claims handling was relevant to the bad-faith 
claim when considered in conjunction with State Farm’s “get tough” 
policy, and the potential bad-faith pattern and practice it 
demonstrated.  The court’s in camera examination revealed State 
Farm’s questionable conduct.  These relevant facts, however, came to 
light after the in camera examination.  Before the in camera 
examination, the only “particularized fact[]”305 asserted by State Farm 
was the assertion that the claim file was “handled routinely.”306  This 
was a general conclusory assertion that exists in most insurance bad-
faith cases.  The “particularized facts” the Tackett court found to 
support waiver were found as a result of the in camera claims file 
review.  The court then appears to use those findings of relevant 
evidence to retroactively support waiver.  Although the concept of 
waiver is not particularly novel, the Tackett court’s low threshold for in 
camera review is.  By using an in camera examination of documents, 
the court puts itself in the position of using its judicial powers to find 
 
 301 Id. at 476-77. 
 302 Id. at 477; see also Palmer v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 861 P.2d 895, 907 (Mont. 1993) 
(holding that although insurer’s expert witness testified that advice of counsel 
influenced the insurer’s decision to deny coverage, such testimony did not waive the 
privilege where insurer did not rely directly on advice of counsel as a defense to bad-
faith allegations). 
 303 Tackett v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Ins. Co., 653 A.2d 254, 257 (Del. 1995). 
 304 Id. 
 305 Id. at 260. 
 306 Id. at 258. 
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relevant information for the plaintiff.  Under the Tackett approach, 
therefore, the court assumes the principal role of lead investigator. 
The Tackett approach results in a judicial hunt for rejection of 
advice of counsel which potentially makes deviation from advice of 
counsel per se discoverable.  Each time the court finds that the 
insurance company sought the advice of counsel and then rejected 
that advice, the rejection would be per se relevant and therefore 
discoverable.  The court does not give any guidance as to what degree 
of deviation from counsel’s advice falls within per se discoverability.  
This approach will have a chilling effect if an insurance company is 
compelled to follow the advice of counsel merely in order to preserve 
the attorney-client privilege, and this approach ignores the fact that 
“advice” is not synonymous with “rigid command.” 
A similar role was assumed by the court in Vanliner.  There, the 
court utilized a procedure in which plaintiff was entitled to an in 
camera review of the insurance company’s claim file.  If, during the in 
camera inspection, the court determines that the file contains 
evidence of the insurance company’s lack of good faith, that 
information is discoverable notwithstanding the fact that it may come 
in the form of attorney-client privileged communications.  According 
to the Vanliner court, any attorney-client communications showing a 
lack of good faith are unworthy of protection through any form of 
privilege.  The court implicitly adopted a per se rule of discoverability 
by analogizing insurance bad-faith cases to fraud.  The Ohio courts 
have a crime or fraud exception to the attorney-client privilege.  By 
making insurance bad-faith claims synonymous with fraud, the court 
has rendered discoverable attorney-client privileged communications 
upon the mere allegation of bad faith without a supporting analytic 
framework. 
A preliminary determination should be made as to whether 
fraudulent conduct on the part of the insurance company has 
occurred and whether such conduct was sufficient to overcome the 
privilege before permitting discovery of attorney-client privileged 
communications.  A factual showing adequate to support a good faith 
belief by a reasonable person that wrongful conduct of a sufficient 
magnitude has taken place should be a preliminary trial court 
determination.  Upon this determination, the court should then 
subject the claims file to an in camera inspection to determine 
whether there is a “foundation in fact” to overcome the privilege 
based upon an allegation of fraud.  This approach is different than 
that used by the Delaware court in Tackett and the Ohio court in 
Vanliner.  In Tackett and Vanliner, the courts invoked the in camera 
examination process upon mere allegation or minimal showing of 
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misconduct.  Under this approach, to assess the question of 
discoverability, a court then injects itself into the attorney-client 
relationship between the insurance company and its outside counsel.  
Discoverability is not based upon the concept of necessity.  Nor is 
discoverability based on an opponent’s true need to have access to 
privileged material in order to rebut direct assertions made by the 
insurance company in the course of litigation.  Rather, discoverability 
is based upon the concept of relevancy.  In Lee, the Arizona court 
held that fairness of the judicial process requires implied waiver 
whenever the insurance company “claims its conduct was proper and 
permitted by law and based in whole or in part on its evaluation of 
the state of the law.”307  A pointed dissent in Lee delivered a eulogy for 
attorney-client privilege in Arizona, in insurance bad-faith cases, as a 
result of the majority’s decision.  In essence, the dissent observed that 
a plaintiff may abrogate the insurance company’s attorney-client 
privilege simply by raising a bad-faith claim on any matter regarding 
an interpretation of the law. 
The decisions in Tackett, Lee, and Vanliner have introduced 
uncertainty into the attorney-client relationship in insurance bad-
faith cases, and discourage insurance companies from seeking 
needed legal advice because they cannot assume the advice will 
remain confidential.  These decisions have imposed a separate 
standard for waiver in the insurance bad-faith context than currently 
exists in other more generalized civil matters outside of the insurance 
context.  The chilling effect of these decisions can only be predicted 
on a theoretical basis: one can predict that the expansion of implied 
waiver reflected by these decisions will have an adverse effect upon 
the attorney-client relationship between insurance companies and 
their outside counsel.  Certainly there is a chill in the air in Delaware, 
Arizona, and Ohio.  The question remains as to whether winter will 
be coming to the American insurance landscape. 
 
 
 307 State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Lee, 13 P.3d 1169, 1179 (Ariz. 2000). 
